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I. Program Requirement Documents (PRD) RISK TITLE: Risk of Performance and Behavioral 
Health Decrements Due to Inadequate Cooperation, Coordination, Communication, and 
Psychosocial Adaptation within a Team 
 
A. Risk statement 
As stated in the Human Research Program Roadmap: Given that the conditions of spaceflight 
missions will likely impact the functioning and behavioral health of the team, including the 
spaceflight crew and ground support, performance and behavioral health decrements may occur 
that will jeopardize mission success and crew health and safety. 
 
B. Context 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Human Research Program (HRP) 
is organized into topic areas called Elements. The Behavioral Health and Performance (BHP) 
Element is tasked with the responsibility of managing three risks: (1) risk of performance 
decrements and adverse health outcomes due to sleep loss, circadian desynchronization, and work 
overload (Sleep); (2) risk of performance and behavioral health decrements due to inadequate 
cooperation, coordination, communication, and psychosocial adaptation within a team (Team); 
and (3) risk of adverse cognitive or behavioral conditions and psychiatric disorders (Behavioral 
Medicine, BMed). The Team Risk is primarily performance-focused. Monitoring tools, 
measures, and countermeasures developed in this area are aimed at enhancing team processes 
and composition configurations that will result in optimized team performance and functioning. 
While each of these risks is addressed in a separate chapter of this book, each risk interacts and 
informs the others. For example, a recent review of human cognitive performance in spaceflight 
analogs includes findings from several studies suggesting negative effects on learning, cognition, 
emotions, and attention in novel environments (Strangman, Sipes, & Beven, 2014) (Category I-
III). This individual cognitive performance is addressed through the BMed Risk, but the effects 
of cognition on learning, training, decision-making, etc., may affect the ability of the team to 
perform. This is considered in team-level cognitive processes research throughout the Team 
Risk. Furthermore, BHP risks overlap with risks in other HRP Elements and must be considered 
in conjunction with one another (see Figure 1). These relationships are outlined in the 
HRP Integrated Research Plan (IRP). The nature of the IRP implies that BHP is continually 
reviewing and updating integration points with other Elements. While research is designed to 
address identified gaps, it will be necessary to update and revise each of the BHP Evidence 
Reports that constitute this document and the IRP as the element gaps are closed and new gaps 
emerge. 
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Figure 1.  Example of possible BHP risks overapped with risks in other HRP elements 
 
C. Operational Relevance 
While BHP operations are focused on supporting current crews and missions, the BHP research 
Pathway to Risk Reduction (PRR) has an applied, clear, future-oriented focus on long duration 
exploration mission (LDEM). BHP Team research addresses the needs of BHP operations 
through projects examining team training, selection and team composition guidelines, and 
general knowledge acquisition through basic research. The 2013 astronaut selection used a BHP 
Team research supported Teamwork Observation Tool. A recent job analysis for LDEM 
missions was conducted as a joint effort by BHP-Operations personnel and the BHP-Research 
group, in conjunction with the astronaut office (Barrett, Holland, & Vessey, 2015) (Category III). 
This job analysis will inform BHP research on selection and team composition needs, leading to 
research which will in turn inform future rounds of astronaut selection supported by BHP 
operations. Unobtrusive measures related to team cohesion developed through BHP Team 
research will help BHP operations monitor aspects of team cohesion in-flight (Kozlowski, 
Chang, Perry, Pearce, Dixon, & Santoro, 2015). BHP-Research also practices Transitions to 
Operations (TtO) in other NASA groups. For example, astronauts and flight controllers engage 
in a team skills training program known as spaceflight resource management (SFRM), adapted 
from the aviation industry’s crew resource management (CRM). BHP personnel act as 
consultants to develop and validate SFRM training programs. This training has grown to 
incorporate a research tested and validated debrief protocol centered on four identified SFRM 
teamwork dimensions (i.e., information exchange, communication delivery, 
leadership/followership and supporting behaviors), and was effective at increasing NASA flight 
controllers team and technical skills and shortening time to certification (Bedwell, Smith-
Jentsch, Sierra, & Salas, 2012) (Category II). This training has spread to other space centers 
(e.g., Marshall Space Flight Center, home to many payload flight controllers) and has been used 
as part of the astronaut candidate (ASCAN) training regimen. The goal for BHP research is to 
transition validated deliverables to operations to make a lasting, positive impact on spaceflight 
teams, now and in the future.  
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II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Team research in the context of LDEM has made great strides in the last few years. In 
comparison to the earlier edition of the NASA HRP Evidence Book, spaceflight research, and 
particularly ground-based analog research, has grown substantially. The results of these efforts 
include studies conducted at traditional, exploration, Isolated, Confined, and Extreme (ICE) 
environment (ICE) analogs (e.g., Antarctic stations), but now importantly include studies from 
several mission simulation analogs, notably, Johnson Space Center’s Human Exploration 
Research Analog (HERA); HERA Experiment Information Package, 2014). Utilization of the 
International Space Station (ISS) for Team Risk research is currently limited. Major challenges 
relevant for the Team Risk are social isolation, physical confinement, a small and diverse crew, 
communication delays between crew and ground, a long duration, and a high consequence 
environment. Each of these conditions affect the coordination, cooperation, psychological well-
being, and team performance. While the ISS remains important for studies, which require 
spaceflight testing and validation, the current conditions on the ISS do not adequately mimic the 
exploration environment for NASA team research, and thus access to analogs is paramount. The 
emphasis on analogs is reflected in this updated evidence review of the BHP Element’s Team 
Risk. Additionally, the Team Risk has reached a tipping point; that is, many NASA-funded and –
supported comprehensive literature reviews and operations assessment of the major team factors 
as applied to LDEMs have provided a clarified picture of the “state of the science.” The 
increasing maturity of this research has highlighted trends in current data and focused the future 
Team Risk research and countermeasure development plan.  
 
Spaceflight evidence for team-level research is lacking, so it is difficult to quantify the impact of 
team-level variables on individual and team-level outcomes relying on data from current 
spaceflight missions. To date, no systematic attempt has been undertaken to measure the 
performance effects of team cohesion, team composition, team training, or team-related 
psychosocial adaptation during spaceflight. The Team Risk is a relatively young, defined 
research area for NASA, with substantial growth only within the last decade, and limited 
availability to performance data. As a result, spaceflight evidence is lacking with regard 
identifying specifically what team composition, level of training, amount of cohesion, or quality 
of psychosocial adaptation is necessary to reduce the risk of performance errors in space. 
However, astronaut journals and interviews, and reports from spaceflight subject matter experts 
(SMEs) and researchers acknowledge the importance of the team to mission success and to 
maintain crew health, and offer descriptive testimonies as to the importance of the teams in 
space. Finally, Team Risk research, as noted above, does not rely on spaceflight research to the 
extent required by many other Risks. Thus, while there is a lack of spaceflight evidence, 
evidence gleaned from ground and analog studies enables Risk gap closure.  
 
Ground-based studies provide much greater quantitative evidence for team functioning in ICE 
environments. Academic research on teams has produced dozens of meta-analyses from which to 
understand the general relationships among team inputs (e.g., team member characteristics and 
skills, job context), team processes and emergent states (e.g., coordination, communication, 
cooperation, cohesion, trust, shared cognition), and team outcomes (e.g., effectiveness, errors, 
adaptation). Teams are complex, incorporating individual characteristics of team members, but 
also existing at a level that is greater than the sum of its parts. This necessitates integration with 
other individual-focused Risks of the NASA HRP, including BMed, Sleep, and Space Human 
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Factors and Habitability (SHFH). Much of this integration occurs through the Human Systems 
Risk Board, a standing committee of scientists from all research Elements in the Human 
Research Program. A lack of team functioning may be a stressor in some circumstances, but the 
unit of the team itself often acts as a countermeasure. For example, leadership and teammate 
support can facilitate individual functioning and encourage psychological and physically healthy 
behaviors and attitudes. However, more research is needed with regard to teams in long duration 
exploration missions and the remaining gaps in the research are included in this report. 
 
III. INTRODUCTION 
A team is defined as: “two or more individuals who interact socially and adaptively, have shared 
or common goals, and hold meaningful task interdependences; it is hierarchically structured and 
has a limited life span; in it expertise and roles are distributed; and it is embedded within an 
organization/environmental context that influences and is influenced by ongoing processes and 
performance outcomes” (Salas, Stagl, Burke, & Goodwin, 2007, p. 189). From the NASA 
perspective, a team is commonly understood to be a collection of individuals that is assigned to 
support and achieve a particular mission. Thus, depending on context, this definition can 
encompass both the spaceflight crew and the individuals and teams in the larger multi-team 
system who are assigned to support that crew during a mission.   
 
The Team Risk outcomes of interest are predominantly performance related, with a secondary 
emphasis on long-term health; this is somewhat unique in the NASA HRP in that most Risk 
areas are medically related and primarily focused on long-term health consequences. In many 
operational environments (e.g., aviation), performance is assessed as the avoidance of errors. 
However, the research on performance errors is ambiguous. It implies that actions may be 
dichotomized into “correct” or “incorrect” responses, where incorrect responses or errors are 
always undesirable. Researchers have argued that this dichotomy is a harmful oversimplification, 
and it would be more productive to focus on the variability of human performance and how 
organizations can manage that variability (Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006) (Category III1). 
Two problems occur when focusing on performance errors: 1) the errors are infrequent and, 
therefore, difficult to observe and record; and 2) the errors do not directly correspond to failure. 
Research reveals that humans are fairly adept at correcting or compensating for performance 
errors before such errors result in recognizable or recordable failures. Astronauts are notably 
adept high performers. Most failures are recorded only when multiple, small errors occur and 
humans are unable to recognize and correct or compensate for these errors in time to prevent a 
failure (Dismukes, Berman, Loukopoulos, 2007) (Category III). 
 
More commonly, observers record variability in levels of performance. Some teams commit no 
observable errors but fail to achieve performance objectives or perform only adequately, while 
other teams commit some errors but perform spectacularly. Successful performance, therefore, 
cannot be viewed as simply the absence of errors or the avoidance of failure Johnson Space 
Center (JSC) Joint Leadership Team, 2008). While failure is commonly attributed to making a 
major error, focusing solely on the elimination of error(s) does not significantly reduce the risk 
of failure. Failure may also occur when performance is simply insufficient or an effort is 
incapable of adjusting sufficiently to a contextual change (e.g., changing levels of autonomy). 
                                                 
1 The four NASA categories of evidence are defined in the Introduction provided for this Human Health and 
Performance Risks of Space Exploration Mission book. 
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The surest way to reduce the risk of failure is to achieve optimal performance. If NASA is to 
spend the same amount of money launching one of two crews, and both crews have an equal risk 
of committing performance errors but one crew is more likely to perform more of the mission 
objectives (or otherwise perform better), it follows that the most desirable crew remains the 
highest-performing crew. Additionally, selecting the crew with an increased likelihood of 
sustained behavioral health and team functioning is another important consideration that must be 
proportionately balanced with performance, due to the influence on performance and long-term 
health. One of the goals of the Team Risk research is to optimize performance in a high-
performing population, support behavioral health, and extend success to the context of the new 
LDEM mission profiles.   
 
Consideration of performance in the Team Risk is divided into two main categories: team task 
performance and team functioning. Team task performance often includes more objective 
measures of performance, e.g., number of task/mission objectives achieved, speed, error rates 
and task dependent metrics. Current efforts within BHP research are underway to establish a 
more robust set of objective performance measures that capture the team performance variability 
beyond error rate, e.g., accomplishing mission or task goals. Importantly for astronaut crews, 
team functioning includes aspects of living and working together in extreme, stressful 
environments. Team functioning is a broad term, capturing elements of: 
 Teamwork – interdependent acts that convert inputs to outcomes through cognitive 
processes, communications, and behaviors to achieve collective goals;  
 Team Cohesion – the tendency for a group to operate in a unified fashion while working 
towards a goal or to satisfy the psychosocial needs (e.g., feeling of belonging and 
contributing to the team) of its members 
 Cooperation – attitudes, beliefs and feelings of the team that drive behavior  
 Coordination – utilization of behavioral processes needed to transform team resources 
into outcomes, and,  
 Psychosocial Adaptation – ability to cope with stressors, and balancing individual and 
team needs 
 
Many factors typically considered to be inputs and emergent states (i.e., dynamic properties of 
the team that vary as a function of team context, inputs, processes, and outcomes; Marks, 
Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 2001) may be subsumed into team functioning, with the ultimate outcome 
of interest being team performance. As Team Risk research has shifted focus to LDEM, mission 
factors of distance to Earth and communication delays, small habitable volume, isolation and 
non-rotating crew, and especially the 30 month duration, will add to more typical stressors 
experienced in team and spaceflight settings, influencing the team factors in new and important 
ways. Astronaut journals kept by ISS crew members and recent operations assessments with long 
duration flyers of 6 months reveal many instances of team disruption and interpersonal frictions 
(Stuster, 2010) (Category III). Notably, performance and functioning decrements were 
sometimes attributed to duration, that is, the belief that “you can get along with anyone for two 
weeks” (the duration of Shuttle missions), but a LDEM scenario provoked sentiments of concern 
that the assembled crew had to be particularly well-suited to working together for very long 
durations in order to avoid these issues. Almost all astronaut journals stated that “getting along” 
with crewmates was the highest pre-flight priority.  
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A series of NASA-directed literature reviews and operations assessments, in conjunction with 
meta-analytic examination of teams and team outcomes supports several trends:  
 Scientifically-based selection of a team-oriented personality, paired with deliberative 
team composition, predicts team performance, cohesion, team processes, and well-being 
(Barrick, Mount, & Judge, 2001; Bell, 2007) (Category I). 
 Team cohesion leads to improved performance, which leads to greater cohesion, in a 
mutually supportive relationship (Mathieu, Kukenberger, D’Innocenzo, & Reilly, 2015) 
(Category I) (Kozlowski et al., 2015) (Category III). 
 Team training positively influences team performance and functioning (Delise et al., 
2010; Salas et al., 2008) (Category I). Debriefing improves performance 20-25% 
(Tannenbaum & Cerasoli, 2013) (Category I).  
 Complex relationships within the multi-team system may be impaired by communication 
delays and changing team autonomy, but countermeasures offer some mitigation of 
performance and team functioning decrements (Fischer & Mosier, 2015) (Category II).  
 Leaders can positively affect team performance, functioning, and individual well-being. 
Leadership/followership requires training in several leadership models, and training is 
needed with regard to the knowledge and skill to switch between leadership models and 
leader/follower as the situation requires (Gibson et al., 2015).  
 Enhanced team cognition and shared mental models lead to positive performance 
outcomes, and are capable of being developed in training (Fiore et al., 2015; DeChurch & 
Mesmer-Magnus, 2010) (Category III, I).  
 Many team processes (e.g., team cognitive processes, communication, coordination, 
conflict management) and other moderating factors (e.g., leadership approach, autonomy) 
have a complex and nuanced relationship with team outcomes, which still require 
research in a long duration, ICE context.  
 
IV. EVIDENCE 
 
The four NASA categories of evidence are defined in the Introduction provided for this Human 
Health and Performance Risks of Space Exploration Mission book. As the research conducted in 
mission simulation analogs and ICE field analogs has recently increased, there is a growing 
spaceflight-relevant evidence base, especially in the stronger categories of evidence. Most team 
research is well-suited for ground-based studies. Thus, there is less utilization of the spaceflight 
environment than in other HRP Risk areas, which focus on physiological health effects and rely 
on microgravity conditions and combination of unique ISS ICE factors to test feasibility of tools 
and countermeasures. This reliance on analogs and analogous populations is reflected in the 
evidence below. The review provides a summary of the state of knowledge, developed measures 
and monitoring tools for assessing teams, and existing and suggested countermeasures for 
developing and maintaining team functioning and performance.  
 
A. Spaceflight Evidence 
1. Sources of evidence 
Collection of truly team-level data in spaceflight has historically been a rare occurrence. Most 
data is collected at the individual level, and team-level data has mainly received attention only 
insofar as overall team performance or mission objective success is a concern. Anecdotal reports 
of teamwork issues have been noted, but systematic analysis of such data has been limited. In the 
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more recent ISS missions, teams and the multi-team system have received more attention, and 
thus, more measurement, but research from spaceflight is somewhat lacking due to research and 
operational constraints (e.g., few good outcome measures and performance metrics). More 
quantitatively-orientated data is housed in the NASA Life Science Data Archive (LSDA), but 
other qualitative sources allow rich anecdotal examples and allow for content analysis. As an 
example of the latter, Dr. Jack Stuster’s Journals Project (2010) and the NASA history project 
and transcripts offer text from which to mine frequencies and behavioral patterns.    
 
2. Predictors and contributing factors to team performance and functioning 
a. Selection  
Early candidates for astronaut selection in the 1950s and 1960s were largely military test pilots, 
thought to be naturally suited to high-stress and high-risk situations, with little thought given to 
team-orientation or team skills. Later selection rounds during Shuttle and ISS years have 
reoriented the astronaut corps with more astronaut-scientists selected to fill the new mission 
profiles and tasks, and has seen an increase in varying expertise and personalities, multi-national 
crews, gender diversity, and ethnic diversity. These diversity factors have large implications for 
spaceflight team performance and functioning. Evaluation of psychological characteristics waxed 
and waned during the first 30 years of astronaut selection, but did include consideration of 
emotional stability, motivation, and interpersonal relationships (Santy, 1994). In general, 
selection research in spaceflight is severely limited, due in part to a lack of data from a small 
population of astronauts, and in part to the lack of performance data with which to validate 
measures and methods. For example, Russian researchers have long collected personality data on 
cosmonauts (Kanas & Manzey, 2008), but the empirical linking of personality factors to specific 
performance levels that are necessary to provide cut-scores or norms for selection still eludes 
these researchers, perhaps because of small samples or inadequate performance data. Typically, 
space agencies have not provided objective performance data on enough astronauts to create a 
reasonably sized sample on which to perform an analysis. This lack of data also obfuscates the 
ability to identify optimal selection criteria and methods for teams. Efforts begun in the Shuttle 
era to include more rigorous personality testing, foundational job analyses, psychological 
evaluations and interviews were expanded during the early years of ISS. Additionally at NASA 
in 2009 and 2013, an experimental team simulation to assess teamwork capabilities was 
included. A multi-trait, multi-method approach is a best practice for job selection and 
assessment, and space agencies have increasingly added group-task observations to assess 
individuals on team-oriented factors. Surveys, interviews, and group tasks used by European 
Space Agency (ESA) in the 2008-2009 astronaut selection targeted interpersonal and 
intercultural competencies, communication skills, leadership-followership flexibility, and group 
suitability and teamwork skills, with reported success (Maschke, Oubaid, & Pecena, 2011; Inoue 
& Tachibana, 2013) (Category III). Spaceflight researchers (e.g., Kanas et al., 2009) have also 
called for the development and validation of behavioral testing tools that include team exercises 
and isolation tasks that mimic LDEM conditions. The more recent Japanese Aerospace and 
Exploration Agency (JAXA) rounds of selection have begun to answer that call by using an 
isolation and confinement facility to mimic mission conditions, and assessing applicants’ 
teamwork ability and performance, for one week (Inoue & Tachibana, 2013) (Category III). 
However, the current assessments employed by spaceflight agencies do not spotlight LDEM. 
This is somewhat expected as those missions may be 20+ years in the future, but ISS missions 
beginning in 2015 have longer durations of one year, as compared to the previous standard of 6 
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month mission durations. As years targeted for exploration missions, the end of ISS in the mid-
2020s, the needed ASCAN and assigned mission training time, and the wait time for astronauts 
in the flight queue are all considered in tandem, astronaut selection for LDEM may begin within 
the next 10-15 years. Agencies are beginning to turn the focus to LDEM selection and 
increasingly, individual selection factors that influence team performance.  
 
In 2014, a job analysis was conducted to determine competencies for missions similar to current 
ISS missions, and importantly, for future LDEMs (Barrett, Holland, & Vessey, 2015) (Category 
III). To update earlier NASA job analytic efforts (e.g., Galarza & Holland, 1999) (Category III), 
this job analysis collected interview data from 21 ISS astronauts, 2 Shuttle, and 3 veteran NASA 
behavioral specialists, with advisement from a core panel of astronauts and 2 job analysis SMEs. 
Fifteen astronauts completed follow-up surveys rating the importance and trainability of each 
identified competency. The resulting 18 competencies  highlight the importance of teamwork, 
small-group living, adaptability, and judgment, and the importance ratings for each of these 
increased when comparing the ISS-like missions (Type A,B) to the short- and long-duration 
exploration mission profile (Type C,D) (see Table 1, Table 2). For skills needed at hire, 
sociability, adaptability, motivation, communication, and teamwork were rated as the top five by 
the SMEs. Respondents stated that although teamwork is part of astronaut training, a minimal 
competency is needed for selection. This job analysis highlights the importance of team skills 
(i.e., the means were fairly high), especially for LDEM, provides a target for the development of 
future selection systems, and provides insight into which skills are needed at hire vs later 
training. Notably, mission profiles for Types C and D, exploration missions that include asteroid 
and Mars missions, received higher ratings of importance for most competencies when compare 
to Types A and B, the low Earth orbit missions. While technical competencies are important, 
especially for the LDEM profile, selection of technical competencies is the responsibility of 
technical areas (e.g., Robotics may insert robotic tasks in the selection process), and applicants 
are screened to select out non-STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) 
degrees. BHP is responsible for other non-technical and team-oriented characteristics. In 
addition, the astronaut selection process considers many other factors beyond the Team Risk, for 
example, candidates must be able to pass a Level 1 physical for physiological health assessment 
and psychological evaluations related to the BMed Risk are also assessed. Other chapters in this 
evidence book cover the associated characteristics that are evaluated in the selection process that 
are relevant to other BHP Risks in more detail.  
 
Table 1. Mission profiles for astronaut job analysis. 
Mission Type A B C D 
Duration (up to) 6 Months 12 Months 12 Months 12 - 36 Months 
Distance from 
Earth 
Low Earth 
Orbit 
Low Earth 
Orbit 
Deep Space 
Exploration 
Deep Space 
Exploration 
Crew Size 6 6 4 4-6 
Vehicle Size Large Large Medium/Small Medium/Small 
Communication 
Delay (one-way) 
.5 – 3 Seconds .5 – 3 Seconds 8 – 10 Minutes 10 – 20 Minutes 
Note: Adapted from Barrett et al., 2015. 
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Table 2. Competency importance ratings derived from the updated astronaut job analysis for 
each mission. 
  Type A M Type B M Type C M Type D M 
1 Teamwork 82.33 Teamwork 82.71 Self-Care 93.93 Self-Care 95.14 
2 Communication 79.40 Self-Care 82.57 Small Group 
Living 
92.29 Technical 94.21 
3 Adaptability 79.20 Judgment 81.07 Teamwork 90.50 Small Group 
Living 
94.07 
4 Self-Care 79.13 Adaptability 80.43 Judgment 90.21 Judgment 92.57 
5 Judgment 78.67 Communication 80.21 Technical  90.00 Motivation 92.00 
6 Situational 
Followership 
78.60 Small Group 
Living 
78.86 Autonomous 
Worker 
89.07 Teamwork 91.50 
7 Technical 75.80 Situational 
Followership 
78.57 Motivation 88.07 Adaptability 91.00 
8 Motivation 75.60 Motivation 76.79 Adaptability 87.79 Autonomous 
Worker 
89.59 
9 Learner/Teacher 75.00 Sociability 76.36 Communication 87.07 Communication 88.86 
10 Sociability 74.40 Learner/Teacher 75.59 Situational 
Leadership 
87.00 Situational 
Leadership 
87.64 
11 Confidence 73.67 Situational 
Leadership 
75.14 Sociability 83.43 Emotional 
Independence 
86.00 
12 Operations 
Orientation 
72.73 Confidence 74.21 Emotion 
Management 
83.00 Sociability 85.79 
13 Small Group 
Living 
71.13 Technical 74.07 Operations 
Orientation 
82.71 Operations 
Orientation 
84.14 
14 Situational 
Leadership 
70.40 Operations 
Orientation 
73.57 Situational 
Followership 
82.07 Emotion 
Management 
83.71 
15 Autonomous 
Worker 
69.27 Emotion 
Management 
71.57 Emotional 
Independence 
81.07 Situational 
Followership 
83.29 
16 Emotion 
Management 
68.80 Autonomous 
Worker 
70.43 Learner/Teacher 80.14 Learner/Teacher 81.93 
17 Family 62.73 Family 66.71 Confidence 79.43 Confidence 81.00 
18 Emotional 
Independence 
60.20 Emotional 
Independence 
66.36 Family 75.64 Family 75.86 
Note: M = mean score of SME ratings on a 100-point scale. Colors call attention to ratings of importance, within 
each mission type. Adapted from Barrett et al., 2015. 
 
Selection of individuals with a team orientation, team skills, in addition to other needed-at-hire 
traits, skills, and behaviors identified in the job analysis competencies have been studied in a 
limited capacity in spaceflight. Two major models of personality, a variable that informs several 
of the competencies, have been considered in the NASA context. The Spence-Helmreich, or 
“Right Stuff”, model is composed of Instrumentality (e.g., goal orientation) and Expressivity 
(e.g., interpersonal attitudes and behaviors) (Helmreich et al., 1990; Santy, 1994), which is 
broken down into several positive and negative traits. The dimensions of this model were 
clustered into the Right Stuff profile (high positives, low negatives). Astronauts, when compared 
to the general population, tend to be higher on instrumentality and slightly lower on expressivity 
(Musson & Keeton, 2011) (Category III). Work orientation was related to achieving an 
administrative leadership role. Spaceflight studies have found positives were associated with 
effectiveness on teamwork tasks, and astronauts with the Right Stuff profile positively 
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influenced team performance (McFadden, Helmreich, Rose, & Fogg,, 1994; Musson, Sandal, & 
Helmreich, 2004) (Category III). This cluster was also related to improved qualities of group 
living and job competence. Relatedly, small group living was identified as one of the most 
important competencies for LDEM in the recent job analysis, as was motivation to a lesser 
degree (Barrett et al., 2015) (Category III). Motivation is related to dimensions of instrumentality 
and was recommended in a series of NASA SME interviews to be an important selection factor 
for LDEM when considering the team (Morgeson, 2015) (Category IV).  Detailed analysis of 
crew members’ motivations recorded in spaceflight transcripts, crew journals, and other 
biographical materials revealed ISS crew members’ need for achievement was mentioned most 
frequently and increased from pre- to in-flight (Brcic, 2010) (Category III). Need for affiliation 
was mentioned next most frequently and peaked in-flight, while power motive was relatively low 
with an increase in post-flight. Notably, NASA astronauts and commanders had a higher need for 
power when compared to cosmonauts and engineers, respectively, suggesting there may be 
cultural influences and norms related to personality and selection as well.  
 
However, the NEO-Five Factor Model measure developed by Costa and McCrae (1992) has been 
more accepted in spaceflight and ground-based research. A study of over 15 years of Shuttle-era 
astronaut personality data and career performance found that astronauts had low scores for 
neuroticism, moderate for extraversion, and were very high on agreeableness and 
conscientiousness (Musson & Keeton, 2011) (Category III). For career performance, 
commanders scored lower on openness, neuroticism was positively related to time to first flight, 
openness was negatively related to number of Extravehicular Activities (EVAs). No personality 
trait was related to number of flight assignments or assignment to Capsule Communicator 
(CapCom). Conclusions drawn from the study suggest that less neurotic individuals are 
perceived as more desirable and behaving appropriately for flight assignment. However, these 
findings call for more research. Other astronaut studies of the five factors have found emotional 
stability to be positively associated with social cohesion, flexibility, communication and 
negatively related to team conflict (Kass, Kass, Samaltedinov, 1995) (Category III). High 
agreeableness and low openness were related to interpersonal and technical effectiveness, and 
low levels of negative personality characteristics were found only among the most effective 
astronauts (Rose, Fogg, Helmreich, & McFadden, 1994) (Category III).  
 
Another individual characteristic likely needed at hire (Barrett et al., 2015) (Category III) 
includes adaptability and motivation. Individual adaptation can indeed influence team processes 
and outcomes. A review (Collins, 2003) (Category III) suggested that astronaut candidates are 
ideally highly adaptable, given the high consequence environment. Greater adaptability may 
enable adjustment to the stressful ICE environment of space, working with a diverse crew, and 
the shifting of autonomy in future LDEM (Kanas et al., 2009; Kealey, 2004) (Category III). 
Motivation may also play a role in maintaining focus, affiliation with crewmates, and adapting to 
the environment as smaller problems are likely to become bigger over the course of the long 
duration (Morgeson, 2015) (Category III). Adaptability may also allow for greater ease in 
switching between tasks, leader and follower roles, interdependent vs. independent work without 
incurring performance decrements. Other reviews of the spaceflight context have argued that 
astronauts must be flexible in problem-solving, especially when facing unique and unpredictable 
LDEM events, which is related to the larger selection factor of cognition and team cognitive 
processes (Fiore, Wiltshire, Sanz & Pajank, 2015; Orasanu, 2005) (Category III). Astronaut 
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selection methods ensure only highly capable and intelligent candidates join the corps (Kanas et 
al., 2009) (Category III), but attention to specifically selecting for team cognition has been very 
limited. Several skills needed at hire may only require some indication of competence with the 
intention to develop those skills during training, for example, communication and teamwork 
(Barrett et al., 2015) (Category IV). While these skills and the other personality characteristics 
are considered in addition to the technical skills of the applicants, the goal of the astronaut 
selection committee is to choose a whole person. No one factor should outweigh the others when 
considering the whole profile of an astronaut candidate. 
 
Summary points related to spaceflight evidence and selection: 
 Current selection follows best practices of a multi-trait, multi-method approach, 
emphasizing the whole person, which will continue in the future.  
o Technical skills and physical fitness are not the focus of BHP research. 
 An updated job analysis highlights competencies related to future LDEM (Tables 1, 2). 
o Some competencies may require a minimum level at time of hire (e.g., 
communication), with the understanding that astronaut training is extensive.  
o Other competencies require a high level at time of hire (e.g., motivation).  
 Preferred future astronauts in LDEM are team-oriented, resilient and emotionally stable, 
adaptable to different situations and cultures, motivated, cognitively capable, and live 
well with others.  
   
b. Team Composition 
Selection of team-oriented individuals or candidates with skills that help them function well in a 
team setting may be most relevant for this risk area when considering the composition of an 
intact team. The interaction of personalities and other characteristics may mitigate or exacerbate 
situations that may cause team performance and functioning decrements. These factors, or 
potential faultlines, include homogeneity of personalities, complementary needs, shared interests, 
shared values and norms, emotional attitudes towards teammates, and demographic differences 
such as common language, gender, expertise, age, ethnicity, and nationality, (Kanas & Manzey, 
2008) (Category III). Deep-level characteristics, named in the earlier part of the list, affect team 
performance and cohesion more strongly and for longer than surface-level, or demographic, 
differences (Bell, 2007; (Bell, Villado, Lukasik, Belau, & Briggs, 2011) (Category I). These 
differences may also lead to subgroup formation, which then negatively affects team functioning. 
Mir missions, in which a series of NASA astronaut was “hosted” by cosmonauts one at a time on 
board the Russian space station, saw reduced team functioning during one mission when one 
astronaut displayed withdrawal behaviors and experienced depressive symptoms (Burroughs, 
1998). This situation demonstrated a multi-dimensional faultline, that is, a division on several 
factors (e.g., host-guest roles, nationality, cultural values), and tokenism, being the only crew 
member with a particular characteristic. With a long duration team, the small differences may be 
exaggerated (Stuster, 2010) and cause disruption to team functioning as the mission proceeds. 
Group interaction was the fourth most mentioned topic in the journals, following work, outside 
communications, and adjustment. One entry stated “I’m finding myself losing tolerance for T. I 
can’t explain exactly what it is that bothers me.” (p.22), indicating that small differences may 
accumulate over time, with potentially little understanding as to why it happens. Much anecdotal 
evidence relates stories of astronauts and cosmonauts experiencing and dealing with cultural 
differences in attitudes and behaviors, both for work and non-work interactions. Mir astronauts 
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experienced a decline in bonding among the crew, personal growth, and task orientation, which 
often corresponded to faultlines (Kanas et al., 2001). Friendships and trust between 
crewmembers of different cultural backgrounds has been reported, but these positive feelings 
decreased over time (Suedfeld, Wilk, & Cassel, 2013). Further consideration of mutli-cultural 
differences must consider the development of space programs in other countries (e.g., China, 
India) (Ehrenfreund, Peter, Schrogl, & Logsdon, 2010) (Category IV).  
 
Other variables have received less attention in the spaceflight literature. One consideration is that 
of the multi-team system for LDEMs, which includes Mission Control teams. Conflict between 
Mission Control Center (MCC) and spaceflight crews has been reported (Stuster, 2010) 
(Category III), but unfortunately, very little research exists for Multi-Team System (MTS) and 
team composition in spaceflight. CapComs were suggested to be an important liaison between 
the crew and MCC, thus, their compatibility with both groups may carry more importance than 
interactions between crew and the entire MTS (Bell, Brown, Outland, & Abben, 2015) (Category 
IV). However, this relationship will likely change in LDEM with communication delays. With 
regard to gender, work examining coping strategies of astronauts and cosmonauts found that 
women were much more likely to employ to emotion-oriented coping strategy of attributing 
events to luck (Suedfeld, Brcic, & Legkaia, 2009) (Category III), suggesting there are some 
differences between men and women in reactions to spaceflight conditions. Interviews of 
spaceflight SMEs also reported some gender differences and conflict due to gender (Bell et al., 
2015) (Category IV). Research on variables such as personalities and gender, and suggestions for 
team composition countermeasures, is included in the ground-based evidence below. 
 
Summary points related to spaceflight evidence and team composition: 
 Current team composition lacks systematic and scientific rigor.  
 Algorithms are needed to compose future LDEM teams, balancing personalities, 
technical skills, and other individual differences (e.g., gender, nationality). 
o Faultlines and tokenism should be avoided.  
o Research is need for team composition considering the entire multi-team system, 
and in LDEM conditions.  
 
c. Team Autonomy, Communication, and the Multi-Team System 
Teams in space are physically isolated from ground, and experience some limited psychological 
isolation. However, real-time communication technologies (e.g., communication loops with 
MCC, Internet Protocol (IP) phone) and other technologies (e.g., email, video messaging, 
internet) ensure the ISS crews are well-connected with colleagues, professional support, and 
friends and family on Earth.  Due to the design of the vehicles to be primarily controlled from 
the ground, MCC has been the brain of the operation, while the crew acts as the eyes and hands, 
an arrangement that fosters much coordination across the MTS, especially during emergency 
situations. However, in future LDEM, communication delays due to the great distance of the 
vehicle as it travels away from Earth, will eliminate the real-time communication between crew 
and ground, and limit the asynchronous communications to periodic data bursts. These 
communication constraints will likely result in greater spaceflight crew autonomy from MCC, 
but little is known regarding changing levels of autonomy and impact of autonomy on the team 
over the long duration. There are obvious psychological health implications related to this 
isolation, which are addressed in the BMed chapter. For the Team Risk, autonomy is 
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conceptualized as the “conditions, constraints, and limits that influence the degree of discretion 
by the astronaut or the crew over choices [decisions], actions, and support in accordance with 
standard operating procedures” (Rubino & Keeton, 2010). The MTS has been described 
generally as a network of teams working towards both a common goal and individual team goals 
(Mathieu, Marks, & Zaccaro, 2001). The NASA crew/ground MTS is but one connection in a 
larger MTS, which also includes a network of Mission Control teams within teams, and extends 
across multiple space agencies (e.g., NASA, Russian Space Agency (RSA), ESA) and 
specializations (e.g., astronauts, flight controllers, engineers); isolation from the MTS has several 
implications. 
 
To date, there have been no studies of high crew autonomy in spaceflight for extended periods of 
time, but shifts in operational autonomy are expected to impact psychosocial adaptation to 
spaceflight demands (Kanas & Manzey, 2008). However, a recent related study with ISS crew 
members examined the impact of communication delays of approximately one hour with MCC 
on performance and well-being (Palinkas, Vessey, Chou, & Leveton, 2015) (Category II). Using 
a 50-second one-way delay compared to no delay, results showed comm delays led to delays in 
task completion and stress/frustration were higher. Being understood by others was positively 
related to performance, but astronauts under delays did not understand others as well. Autonomy 
was positively associated with crew and team performance and crew well-being. However, 
autonomy was not a mediator of the relationship between comm delay and outcomes, suggesting 
comm delays and autonomy have a unique influence on performance and health outcomes. This 
study also found notable behavioral changes under comm delays such as asking longer and more 
detailed questions, discussing and planning with crewmates more before calls, less interaction 
with ground, and CapCom slowing down and repeating calls. Implications of this study may be 
incorporated into training and communication tools and protocols to ensure good packaging of 
information, selection of the most critical information for communication, and availability of 
reviewing communications via recordings after a call is completed.  
 
The Astronaut Journals Project (Stuster, 2010) (Category III) offers some additional insight 
regarding communications and autonomy. While communication problems are reported as only a 
small percentage of the “outside communications” category, communications with MCC was 
second-most mentioned category (a distant second to personal communications). The frequency 
of communications to management and MCC tapered somewhat in the 4th quarter of the mission. 
Astronauts reported interpersonal tensions with MCC, feelings of being patronized, and 
conversely, appreciation and positive interactions with ground personnel. A series of studies of 
Mir and ISS crews found that crews tended to displace negative emotions to MCC, perhaps as a 
coping mechanism to maintain goodwill with fellow crewmates (summarized in Kanas et al., 
2013) (Category III). This pattern also follows general psychology theories of in-group/out-
group dynamics. Spaceflight studies also found cultural norms play a role here as well; 
astronauts reported they may go almost all day with speaking to MCC and MCC does make 
social support calls to ISS, while they observe Russian “marathon discussions” and work-
focused calls, another implication for LDEM preparation in addressing autonomy and 
communication mission norms (Stuster, 2010) (Category III). Crews also remarked on the high 
workload and a feeling of being chained to the schedule and to procedures, and expressed 
gratefulness when they were able to “drive their own schedule” and “have some control over our 
lives”. MCC lack of understanding of the time needed for carrying out tasks or overscheduling 
18 
 
the crew was noted as a source of frustration. In Skylab 4, demanding schedules led to 
crew/ground conflict, work stoppage, and trust issues (Stuster, 2011) (Category III).  
 
ISS crews have reported the desire for more autonomy, and it is likely that the increased 
complexity of future LDEM missions will require increased crew discretion, less burdensome 
procedures, and general flexibility to perform tasks and deal with emergencies (Krikalev, Kalery, 
& Sorokin, 2010) (Category III). As the ISS has become a more complex vehicle over the years, 
researchers have already noted that crew members naturally distribute knowledge of certain 
systems, and fail to clearly communicate this localization of knowledge to MCC (Caldwell & 
Onken, 2011) (Category III). These researchers have begun to examine the future mission 
operations of multiple vehicles and LDEM from a human factors perspective. For example, off-
loading some decision-making to automated systems, with the crew or MCC as the final 
decision-maker to perform or abort an action, may be a sound countermeasure. Differing 
command levels may allow a MCC more control (e.g., issuing frequent commands), short-term 
control for a specific period of time, tactical control (the crew is given a task or mission objective 
to accomplish and report back after completion), or strategic control (overarching objectives are 
set during a daily/weekly planning conference and the crew decides how to accomplish them). 
For LDEM, the communication delays will change in length during travel to and from long 
distance destination, another factor to be considered in the degree of autonomy afforded to the 
crew.  
 
Related to adjusting to different levels of autonomy, the ability of the crew to switch from one 
type of work structure or task type to another may also affect team performance, coordination 
and stress. A detailed case study of the MCC MTS response to an anomaly from a Shuttle 
mission shows the importance of examining information within smaller teams and pushing that 
information up in larger MTS meetings (Watts-Perotti & Woods, 2007) (Category III). 
Coordination across levels identified information gaps and hidden disagreements between teams 
in their understanding of the anomaly and approach to problem-solving. Information was 
distributed across the MTS, but switching from within-team analysis to cross-team analysis 
required a cooperative advocacy strategy, which enhanced effectiveness of the MTS. For LDEM, 
team task switching may occur after long periods of autonomy, either planned (e.g., destination 
is reached) or unplanned (e.g., emergencies), requiring coordination with MCC (Smith-Jentsch et 
al., 2015) (Category III). Furthermore, teams may need to switch from independent individual 
tasks to interdependent tasks within the team, switch between different sub-teams, switch 
between tasks (e.g., maintenance vs. science), switch between languages, etc. While these 
switches currently take place on ISS with high frequency, the performance decrements may be 
exacerbated during a long duration mission, in which exists a higher likelihood for boredom and 
entrainment on one style of working during the journey phase, and includes large physical and 
psychological shift events (e.g., arriving to Mars). Entrainment in one working condition can 
negatively affect performance after a switch or situational awareness during the working 
condition, as reported by ISS crew members in a recent operations assessment (Smith-Jentsch, 
2015) (Category III). This assessment suggested that crew members communicate little during 
autonomous tasks, and in the event of differing schedules or major events (e.g., EVAs), crews 
may reduce interactions, and in turn, reduce information exchange and supporting behaviors. 
Team coordination, shared awareness, and supporting behaviors are likely to be reduced. One 
astronaut stated “you look out for people who are excessively tired, rushing, making mistakes”, 
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indicating that loss of awareness of teammates and a lack of supporting behaviors may lead to 
errors. While each mission has a commander, crew members possess expertise in certain areas, 
necessitating a switch between leader and follower roles as their skillsets are required. Current 
ISS crew members acknowledge this expectation of shared leadership, but a leader’s ability to 
drop back while the appropriate follower steps forward is often easier said than done. 
Expectation-setting and shared knowledge of each team member’s strengths may help to 
facilitate this switching process. More research is needed to address these questions for LDEM 
mission designs and development of training and tools for all teams in the MTS, and especially 
with regard to the impact on team functioning and cohesion.  
 
Summary points related to spaceflight evidence and team autonomy, communication, and the 
multi-team system: 
 The multi-team systems includes the spaceflight crew, NASA mission control, the 
network of teams within NASA mission control, other space agencies, and other 
governing bodies directing spaceflight missions.  
o Cultural norms differ with regard to interactions with spaceflight crews and 
mission control.  
 Future LDEM crews will have greater autonomy than current ISS crews, with 
communication delay as a major contributor.  
 Research is needed to understand how these differences may affect team performance, 
coordination, shared cognition, and communication, and switching between different 
styles of working. Countermeasures have grown organically within the space programs, 
but scientific research should drive development for LDEM countermeasures.  
 
d. Team Skills Training 
Long-duration space flights (i.e., flights that are in excess of 6 months), such as ISS missions, are 
so physically, mentally, and emotionally demanding that simply selecting individual crew 
members who have the “right stuff” is insufficient (Flynn, 2005). Training and supporting 
optimal performance, as well as selecting high performers, is a more effective and efficient 
approach than simply selecting high performers (Holland, Hysong, & Galarza, 2007) (Category 
IV). Current astronauts spend a large amount of their careers in training. When first selected as 
an ASCAN to the astronaut corps, ASCANs begin an intensive training period lasting 
approximately two years, which includes high-performance T-38 jet pilot training, survival skills 
and emergency response, technical systems skills (e.g., life support, payload deployment, EVA 
skills, Earth observation), communication protocols and norms such as using the phonetic 
alphabet and packaging communications, group training, cultural and Russian language training, 
physical conditioning, and general professional training for a career in the media spotlight 
(National Research Council, 2011). Similar programs take place at other space agencies (JAXA, 
ESA, and Canadian Space Agency (CSA) have sent astronauts to ASCAN and other NASA 
training), and astronauts from other agencies travel to Houston, TX, and Star City, Russia, for 
training on specific systems and ISS modules. Once an astronaut is assigned to a mission, they 
begin Assigned Crew Training for that specific mission, and additional training takes place on-
board the ISS in-flight. Astronauts may also experience training in mission simulation analogs 
such as NASA Extreme Environment Mission Operations (NEEMO). Several space shuttle 
crews have specifically opted to complete ISS Expedition interpersonal training as a team to 
enhance their “cohesion and performance” (in personal communication with BHP personnel, 
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Shultz, 2007) (Category III). Training team skills and supporting optimal team performance 
entails more than educating astronauts about the technical aspects of the job. It also requires 
equipping those astronauts with the resources that are needed to maintain their psychological and 
physical health in an ICE environment over an extended period of time. As one astronaut wrote 
in his/her journal “We spend all of our [training] time on emergency scenarios and spacewalks. 
Sometimes understanding how to live would go a long way to increasing the success of the 
mission.” (Stuster, 2010, p.20) (Category III). The BHP Operations group currently addresses 
this need through a series of BHP-related trainings for the ASCANs. Components of this training 
are simply NASA knowledge training, for example, an overview of BHP Operations’ role in 
spaceflight support, while others include aspects of team skills. More information regarding this 
training and the psychological support services provided by BHP Operations is described in the 
BMed Risk chapter of this evidence book and below.  
 
It is worth nothing that the training of astronauts from NASA, JAXA, ESA, and CSA are more 
similar to each other than the approach of Roscosmos cosmonauts.  Roscosmos currently uses 
technical, parachute, and survival training events as the venue for behavioral training (Noe et al., 
2011). Training is more theoretical and more reliant on note-taking than manuals. Notably, 
cosmonauts receive pay for performance while on a mission and are evaluated in training with a 
similar tone, while astronauts receive feedback from a variety of sources (e.g., trainers, Astronaut 
Office management, psychological support) and the tone of feedback is more constructive than 
punitive. Future training must find ways to understand the implications of these different 
approaches, and overcome these cultural differences, for the benefit of all crew members.  
 
Many of the training events discussed above naturally contain an element of team skills or train 
skills that may enhance team performance (e.g., communication norms), but the focus on 
teamwork during each event and across each space agency varies. Often, team skills are an 
assumed outcome or by-product of group technical training and activities. Greater focus on the 
importance of teams in space has led to a more targeted focus on developing team skills and 
team skills training according to the available best practices and evidence of team training. Quite 
simply, team training works. Meta-analyses of ground-based teams have examined many aspects 
of team training related to team outcomes in support of that statement. For example, one large 
meta-analysis found support for positive relationships between team training interventions and 
team cognitive, affective, process, and performance outcome (Salas et al., 2008) (Category I). 
This training must be grounded in good science to maximize short-term learning and long-term 
transfer of skills and knowledge to the job (Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001). Research and 
training validation studies conducted in the spaceflight context are limited; however, when 
developing training programs, there are several best practices to follow (Gregory, Feitosa, 
Driskell, Salas, & Vessey, 2013; see Table 3) (Category IV). Related to principles applied before 
training, NASA recognizes the importance of training teamwork skills in the unique operational 
culture, and especially for future LDEMs, to improve teamwork processes and performance, as 
well as cognitive and affective outcomes, in a high-stress environment (National Research 
Council, 2011). These suggestions follow team training best practices for creating a learning 
climate. Additionally, team training needs analyses (Noe, Dachner, Saxton, & Keeton, 2011; 
Smith-Jentsch et al., 2015) (Category III) and an updated job analysis to determine LDEM 
astronaut competencies (Barrett et al., 2015) (Category III) have been conducted, and will 
continue to be updated. For measurement planning, performance levels are an important 
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consideration in relation to training team skills. When considering optimal performance, any 
training design should be accompanied by an evaluation to determine the standards of optimal, 
adequate, or inadequate performance, and what skills help differentiate high- versus low-
performing teams. In this way, training can be validated by checking student progression and the 
performance of teams before and after training. It is therefore recommended that team 
performance standards and levels be documented in the spaceflight context before effective 
training is designed. To date, this type of information is in limited availability to researchers, and 
acquiring such performance data requires a more collaborative better partnership between the 
research and operational communities. 
 
Table 3. A temporal display of the principles of team training 
Before training During training After training 
 Prepare the climate for 
learning 
 Create conditions for 
teamwork 
 Team training needs 
analysis 
 Design a measurement 
plan 
 Include appropriate 
team-based content 
 Follow the appropriate 
instructional principles 
 Support team 
development activities 
 Evaluate the team 
training 
 Promote transfer of team 
training 
 Sustain the conditions 
that foster teamwork  
From (Gregory, Feitosa, Driskell, Salas, & Vessey, 2013). 
 
During training, NASA uses a multi-method approach using lecture and low-fidelity simulations 
(e.g., game-like team coordination paper-and-pencil exercise) and high-fidelity simulations (e.g., 
EVA training in the Neutral Buoyancy Lab), incorporating elements of teamwork and stress 
inoculation training. An important aspect of teamwork skills and experience is NASA’s SFRM, 
derived from the aviation industry’s CRM approach and more recently organized into four 
teamwork elements: information exchange, communication delivery, supporting behavior, and 
leadership/followership (O’Keefe, 2008; Smith-Jentsch, 2015). This is particularly needed for 
astronaut-scientists who are often not directly taught team skills prior to becoming an ASCAN, 
while pilots and flight engineers arrive with CRM skills (Love & Bleacher, 2013). With regard to 
the multi-team system, flight controllers also have SFRM as part of their training flow. Common 
team skills across these groups supports a shared mental model of team skills and processes and 
ultimately, enhances multi-team functioning and performance (DeChurch and Mesmer-Magnus, 
2015) (Category III). All astronauts receive pilot training, which incorporates CRM, and 
participate in National Outdoor Leadership School (NOLS) leadership training, and are evaluated 
on group interactions during mission simulations with a mock Mission Control and EVA 
training. NASA does support team development activities, not simply task training that happens 
to be in a group setting, and this support has increased over time. The Astronaut Office utilizes 
Expeditionary Skills Training, which includes leadership/followership, communication, self-
care, team-care, and teamwork and general group living skills; these overlap well with the 
updated job analysis competencies (Barrett et al., 2015) (Category III). Many of these training 
activities include team-based content and seem to follow instructional principles of information, 
demonstration, practice and feedback, but with regard to after training best practices, true 
validation studies of the effectiveness of this training are largely absent from public data. The 
success of the space program is a powerful, yet anecdotal testament to the effectiveness of team 
22 
 
training currently in place, but future LDEM demands better validated evidence to determine the 
readiness of the crew. Quantitative evidence does exist for the effectiveness of SFRM using 
Team Dimensional Training (TDT) debrief methods with flight controllers (Bedwell, Smith-
Jentsch, Sierra, & Salas, 2012) (Category II). Following a simulation, flight controllers participate 
in a debrief session structured around the four SFRM teamwork elements. Flight controllers 
reduced their certification time by half using TDT, identified more team errors, and had a less 
superficial categorization of incidents and greater learning. Prior TDT studies with U.S. Navy 
teams of submariners found a significant improvement in decision making and reduction in 
tactical errors. While this population is not a spaceflight crew, the actions of the flight controllers 
do influence the performance of spaceflight crews; better training and performance of flight 
controller teams likely lead to a positive impact on spaceflight teams. It is expected these trends 
will continue with the ASCANs now participating in the SFRM training, but performance data 
has not been made available.   
 
Other issues related to astronaut training needs may be gleaned from a recent series of interviews 
with a dozen long duration flyers, identifying five unique work characteristics of long duration 
spaceflight (Smith-Jentsch et al., 2015) (Category III). First, crews will experience variation in 
their task dependency. They work independently a majority of the time, but come together as a 
team for critical tasks such as EVAs. These critical tasks usually require a great deal of 
coordination with the MTS. The shifts in work approach may happen abruptly, or after a long 
period of working independently as an individual or from MCC. Cognitive skills and cues, along 
with leadership/followership skills, may help crews switch without performance decrements. 
Training to establish and maintain crew cohesion and adaptability will support team functioning. 
Second, a variability of tempo, that is, periods of down time or possible boredom in transit on an 
LDEM may be interspersed with period of intense activity (e.g., arriving at Mars to begin 
exploration). In high activity times, crews must use a wide range of problem-solving and 
teamwork skills, as well as shared cognition, to work efficiently. Stress management training is a 
part of the ASCAN training flow, as is expeditionary skills and NOLS, which also address self-
care/self-management. Third, crewmates may not know each other very well prior to launch due 
to how crew training is scheduled, leaving little time for team storming or norming. Substantial 
training with the intact crew must take place prior to launch. Fourth, teams are often very 
diverse. As was discussed in relation to team composition, avoiding faultlines, and cross-cultural 
and adaptability training may mitigate this issues. As such, BHP Operations currently offers 
cross-cultural training to ASCANs, which addresses cultural differences and strategies for 
dealing with cultural differences. Beyond simply understanding cultural differences, crews must 
also have time to get to know each other as individuals. And fifth, the ICE environment with a 
small team must be endured for many months. Again, development of crew cohesion and team 
resilience is important, as is conflict management and communication skills. In addition to the 
trainings previously discussed, assigned crews also receive family-oriented training, covering 
everything from practical concerns (e.g., writing wills, contact persons and mission-specific 
information) to family support services, and psychological training to understand potential 
psychological health threats that may occur on-mission. Ground-based research has more to add 
with regard to how these various characteristics of the LDEM context may be addressed in 
training team competencies.  
 
Summary points related to spaceflight evidence and team skills training: 
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 Astronaut candidate training and assigned mission training are long and rigorous, 
covering task work and teamwork skills.  
o Historically, more attention has been given to task work skills, but LDEMs call 
for more attention to team work skills and simply living with the team. 
 Development of team, psychological well-being maintenance, and interpersonal or soft 
skills should take place regularly over time, with consideration of cultural difference 
related to leadership, communication, performing as a team, and living in an ICE 
environment.  
 
3. Team Emergent States 
a. Team Cohesion, Trust, and Conflict 
Spaceflight evidence regarding cohesion and performance is limited by a paucity of objective 
team performance data. However, case studies, interviews, and surveys that have been done 
within the spaceflight realm provide evidence that issues pertaining to cohesion exist and are 
perceived as threats to effective operations. For example, breakdowns in team coordination, 
resource and informational exchanges, and role conflicts (i.e., common indicators of poor 
cohesion) were mentioned as contributors to both the Challenger and the Columbia space shuttle 
accidents (Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, 2003; Launius, 2004) (Category III). 
Likewise, interviews and surveys that were conducted with flight controllers reveal that mission 
teams are commonly concerned with team member coordination and communications, and that 
interpersonal conflicts and tensions exist (Caldwell, 2005; Parke et al., 2005; Santy, Holland, 
Looper, & Macondes-North, 1993) (Category III). Additionally, the frequency of reported 
negative processes and outcomes tend to increase over the course of the mission. For example, 
cohesion was significantly higher during the early part of missions, and a summary of several 
studies showed a decline in cohesion during the middle and end, with increased reports of crew 
tension and conflict (Dion, 2004; Kanas, 2004) (Category III). The astronaut journals have also 
found a trend of decreasing positive comments related to group interactions over the course of 
ISS missions, and the same trend of increased conflict in the fourth quarter (Stuster, 2010) 
(Category III). Conversely, there was a reported increased frequency of getting along in the 
fourth quarter, suggesting that the group is more aware of group interactions towards the close of 
a mission. One study suggested that in a context of monotony and isolation, the effects of 
potential faultlines, such as cultural diversity, may be intensified and result in negative outcomes 
and group conflict (Kealey, 2004). ISS minority crewmembers have reported that they 
sometimes feel isolated, and more diverse teams have reported lower levels of trust (Suedfeld, 
Wilk, & Cassel, 2013) (Category III). This interpersonal conflict can increase feelings of 
frustration, which may result in psychological closing, a decreased quality and quantity of crew 
communication (Kanas et al., 2009) (Category III). Differences may also lead to subgroup 
formation and treatment of a token member as a less-trusted “guest” (Sandal et al., 2011) 
(Suedfeld et al., 2013) (Category III). Crews reported perceiving greater differences between 
members over time (Sandal et al., 2011) (Category III). These trends have negative implications 
for the functioning of a team, especially a team in a long duration mission in which small 
irritants may become bigger over time. Conflict management training and Private Psychological 
Conferences (PPCs) alleviate some tension and allow the crews to receive guidance and skills to 
combat these friction points, but communication delays will eliminate real-time PPCs and place 
more onus on the in-flight crew to address conflict, decreased cohesion, and maintain team 
performance and functioning. 
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b. Psychosocial adaptation, and team adaptation and resilience 
From a spaceflight perspective, Russian space station Mir’s operations indicate that astronauts 
and cosmonauts are capable of adapting to 6 months in orbit, but reports also indicate that many 
Mir participants who took part in longer duration flights (in excess of 6 months) developed 
symptoms of fatigue, irritability, and minor disorders of attention and memory (Boyd, 2001; 
Kanas et al., 2001) (Category III). ISS evidence discussed above also shows the trend of 
increased team friction over the course of a mission (e.g., Stuster, 2010) (Category III), thus even 
if they have adapted to spaceflight, maintaining resilience over time may be difficult. 
Psychosocial adaptation focuses more on the adjustment to the stressful ICE environment of 
spaceflight, while team adaptation emphases process-based adaptation resulting in adaptive 
responses and increased performance. Most available data on team adaptation is a result of 
analog research, but astronaut journals and other anecdotal information indicates that astronauts 
are often successful at adapting to their environment and maintaining resilience. For example, 
issues that create tension between crewmembers are remedied through informal group 
discussions (Kanas et al., 2009), and crews respond to emergencies, such as ESA astronaut Luca 
Parmitano’s helmet filling with water during an EVA, without lasting psychological distress. 
MCC and crew quickly responded to the event, creating an adaptive, timely plan to direct 
Parmintano to return to the airlock and readied aid to deploy upon his return. Parmitano’s 
crewmates quickly came to his aid with towels to clear away the water after re-entering ISS from 
the airlock. Astronauts undergo extensive training for survival and emergency situations that 
prepare them for quick adaptation to dynamic and high consequence events, and the resilience to 
recover back to nominal after. Countermeasures are currently being investigated to maintain 
team resilience over time, such as in-flight training and crew activities, and team-based activities 
in virtual environments. Understanding psychosocial adaptation and the ability of team to adapt 
and remain resilience over an extend duration requires more research. 
 
Summary points related to spaceflight evidence and team emergent states: 
 Team cohesion, trust and conflict have been linked to performance incidents in past 
missions. Differences related to both surface-level and deep-level differences can lead to 
and exacerbate problems related to team functioning and performance.  
 Current mitigation strategies somewhat rely on real-time communications (e.g., Private 
Psychological Conferences), which will not be available in future LDEM.  
 Astronauts are generally adaptable and resilient, and are trained in emergencies and stress 
management; however, general adaptability and resilience countermeasures will be more 
important for the LDEM and require more strategic research and development.  
 
4. Measures and Monitoring Technologies 
There are few true tools in use to monitor teams currently in-flight from a behavioral and 
psychological perspective. The astronaut journals (Stuster, 2010) and post-mission debriefs offer 
some understanding of team dynamics on the ISS, but a considerable amount of lag time between 
data collection and processing and reporting of that data does not help ground personnel support 
the crew. PPCs, held regularly throughout a mission, have reportedly addressed some concerns 
related to team functioning, but those are not recorded for research nor public monitoring of the 
team, and are kept confidential by the psychological support staff. Individuals measures of 
variables that may have implications for team functioning, such as stress and individual cognitive 
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functioning, are currently covered by the BMed Risk and described in greater detail in that 
chapter. Development of several team-related monitoring tools is a significant focus of ground-
based research. 
 
B. Ground-based Evidence 
1. Sources of evidence 
Almost every research task within the BHP Element requires utilization of a ground-based 
spaceflight analog to understand the risk and to develop and validate measures, standards, and 
countermeasures. Unlike other Risks in HRP, which rely heavily on ISS for research, analogs 
simulating a mission environment and/or the long duration aspect of LDEM is the best proving 
ground for many BHP factors, especially Team Risk factors. Spaceflight analogs include 
controlled, mission simulation analogs such as HERA at JSC, the undersea NEEMO station, the 
University of Hawaii’s long duration Hawai’i Space Exploration Analog and Simulation (HI-
SEAS), now-retired Desert Research and Technology Studies (Desert RATS), and the Russian 
chamber used for the Mars 105 and Mars 500 studies. Short duration field analogs used for 
astronaut training include the underground Cooperative Adventure for Valuing and Exercising 
human behavior and performance Skills (CAVES) managed by ESA and NOLS, a survival 
leadership course. Long duration ICE environment analogs include Antarctic and Artic stations 
such as Concordia Station, and the Antarctic Search for Meteorites (ANSMET); these are 
working research stations or outposts devoted to scientific research such as geology and 
climatology. Research sampling analogous populations from the military, submariners, medical, 
aviation, nuclear plants, fire-fighters, etc., also provides critical evidence for teams operating in 
isolated, confined, and extreme environments in which there is a great deal of stress and pressure 
to remain high-performing. Team performance and functioning is a robust area of research when 
considering typical organizations and industries, with tens of thousands of studies across 
management, industrial/organizational psychology, industrial engineering, human factors, social 
and cognitive psychology journals. Meta-analyses of the foundational relationships in this field 
are reported below to establish a preponderance of evidence that may be extended to spaceflight 
teams, while specific examples of analogous populations, especially from the military and 
spaceflight analogs, provide greater detail and evidence weighted with environmental similarity. 
 
2. Predictors and contributing factors to team performance and functioning 
a. Selection  
Job analyses across many organizations show some common themes for selecting individuals to 
work in teams and in high stress jobs, which is reflected in the latest LDEM identified 
competencies of small group living, teamwork, motivation, and adaptability (Barrett et al., 2015). 
Selection systems for minimum skill levels and inherent personality characteristics should be 
anchored by these 18 competencies. Using the Helmreich Instrumentality-Expressivity Model of 
personality, research of submariners and Antarctic analog personnel found that achievement 
oriented individuals use problem-solving coping strategies, which was predictive of team success 
(Sandal, Endresen, Vaernes, & Ursin, 2003; Leon & Sandal, 2003). The more widely established 
five factor model of personality has been studied repeatedly. A classic meta-analysis by Barrick 
and Mount (updated in Barrick, Mount, & Judge, 2001) (Category I) offers a summary when 
considering personality and job performance. That is, conscientiousness and emotional stability 
is positively related to overall work performance, greater extraversion and agreeableness 
predicted teamwork, and openness was not related to many work outcomes. These findings 
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follow the spaceflight evidence of personality traits in astronauts, and reflect the LDEM oriented 
job analysis calling for sociability at hire and highlighting the importance of teamwork. Analog 
research has found similar trends. In quantitative reviews of psychosocial factors in analog 
environments and populations (e.g., Palinkas, Keeton, Shea, & Leveton, 2011; Schmidt, 2015) 
(Category I), emotional stability allows individuals to direct more energy towards team 
performance and functioning. More highly motivated individuals, as typical of astronauts, are 
focused on “not letting the team down” and cooperating to achieve goals. Schmidt (2015) 
(Category I) found a strong link between personality characteristics and self-care actions with 
health outcomes (e.g., stress), which in turn was related to objective team performance. 
Individual characteristics of self-care and trust were linked to team member exchange, an 
important team process affecting team performance. Individual values also make a difference, as 
teams that consist of members who value being on a team perform better than teams that consist 
of members who do not value being on a team (Bell, 2007; Salas, Kosarzyscki, Tannenbaum, & 
Carnegie, 2005) (Category I; Category III). Members who do not value being on the team are 
less likely to be motivated to learn team skills (Salas et al., 2005) (Category III). The results of 
U.S. Navy research in Antarctica suggest that while technical competence is necessary, it is also 
important to select individuals who exhibit “social compatibility or likeability, emotional control, 
patience, tolerance of others, self-confidence without egotism, the capacity to subordinate 
routinely one’s own interests to work harmoniously as a member of a team, a sense of humor, 
and the ability to be easily entertained” as well as those who are practical and hardworking 
(Stuster, 2011) (Category III). Thus, selecting for greater individual motivation to maintain 
performance and health as well as selecting for traits that lead to positive interaction and 
coordination/cooperation with teammates will enhance team processes and performance. 
 
Individual characteristics such as cognition and adaptation, as they relate to teams, are also 
important. Reviews of the literature, when considering the challenges of LDEM, discuss 
adaptation as both an individual trait and a team-level trait (Maynard, Kennedy, & Sommer, 
2015) (Category III), and cognition at multiple levels of analysis (Fiore et al., 2015) (Category 
III). Adaptability may apply to both working with others and to working within varying 
conditions, situations, and events. Notably, cognitive ability is positively associated with 
adaptation, as is goal orientation (LePine, 2005) (Category I). While individual cognition is 
approached from the BMed Risk, individual cognitive processes are subsumed under team-level 
cognitive processes. Personality may influence these processes; for example, agreeableness is 
positively related to the development of shared mental models, and more extraverted individuals 
are likely to communicate more, facilitating information exchange and coordination. Meta-
analyses have found that information sharing positively predicts team performance, and that 
cooperation enhanced this relationship (Mesmer-Magnus & DeChurch, 2009) (Category I). A 
literature review of military and other analogous populations found that a minimum level of 
internal motivation and engagement, as well as high levels of commitment and willingness to 
accept challenges, ability in intuitive decision-making, and emotion regulation are important 
characteristics for teams that exercise shared leadership (Gibson et al., 2015). Shared leadership 
is similar to the leadership/followership structure used for current and future spaceflight 
missions. These characteristics should follow needed leadership/followership characteristics 
identified in the collective, dyadic, socio-emotional, and crisis leadership models. Consideration 
of these variables during selection is warranted.  
 
27 
 
Summary points related to ground-based evidence and selection: 
 Individual traits (e.g., emotional stability, agreeableness, self-care, motivation, 
sociability, team-orientation, leadership/followership flexibility, adaptability and 
resilience) enhance individual and team performance and functioning.  
 
b. Team Composition 
Teams are more than simply the sum of their parts. For example, a meta-analysis found that team 
efficacy and team potency were positively related to team performance (Gully et al., 2002) 
(Category I) and that team potency remains a significant predictor of performance even when 
considering the collective ability of the team members (Hecht, Allen, Klammer, & Kelly, 2002) 
(Category II). Several analog studies have investigated the compatibility factors listed by Kanas 
and Manzey (2008) (Category III). Notably, the interactions of these factors have also been 
examined; for example, the only woman, a Canadian, in the Simulated Flight of International 
Crew on Space Station (SFINCSS) analog study, was reportedly harassed by one of the male 
crew members from Russia (Sandal, 2004). Reports of the incident cited differing cultural views 
on gender norms as a contributor. Often, gender norms become an issue in the presence of other 
salient variables such as age or culture (Rosnet, Jurion, Cazes, & Bachelard, 2004). Cultural 
diversity can lead to process loss from increased task conflict and decreased social 
integration/cohesion (Stahl, Maznevski, Voigt, & Jonsen, 2010) (Category I), and faultlines are 
related to greater conflict, and to lower team cohesion, performance and team member 
satisfaction (Thatcher & Patel, 2011) (Category I). Differences in values such as benevolence, 
tradition, and self-direction were identified as drivers of the Mars 500 crew decreasing in team 
cohesion over time (Sandal & Bye, 2015) (Category III). Subgrouping may also have health 
implications; for example, Antarctic winter-over teams with greater subgrouping experienced 
higher levels of depression, anxiety, anger, and fatigue, than more cohesive teams (Palinkas, 
Gunderson, Johnson, & Holland, 2000) (Category III). Tokenism had a negative relationship to 
social support (which was positively related to team performance) across several analog studies 
(Schmidt, 2015) (Category I). A NASA-sponsored review and operations assessment of team 
composition in 24 field and mission simulation analogs related to LDEM provides excellent 
insight into the complexity of factors future mission planners must consider (Bell et al., 2015) 
(Category III; see Table 4 Conclusions suggest surface-level differences interfere with social 
integration, but teams with deep-level similarities on values, needs, interest, and personality had 
better social integration. However, teams with a greater number of dominant or extroverted 
members were more incompatible. Trends across analog research also found these characteristics 
were predictive of team processes (e.g., coordination), emergent states (e.g., cohesion), stress, 
performance, and subgrouping, such that greater homogeneity often led to more positive 
outcomes. In an extensive review of ICE environments, crew homogeneity was positively related 
to social compatibility (Palinkas et al., 2010) (Category III). However, caution is needed; it is 
highly unlikely that a homogenous crew will be assembled for future international LDEM that 
requires a wide range of knowledge and skills, and calls for a multi-cultural representation of 
humanity. Homogeneity may result in poor team performance stemming from ineffective team 
processes such as groupthink. Informal leadership roles, and appropriate switching between 
leader/follower roles may help foster group solidarity in a heterogeneous crew, where varying 
expertise is needed at different times during a mission and leader support can improve group 
coherence, as suggested by Antarctic research (Johnson, Boster, & Palinkas, 2003).  
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Table 4. Summary of How Team Composition Relates to Missions Success 
 Path 1 Path 2 
Brief path 
description 
By affecting social integration By affecting team processes and 
emergent states related to team task 
completion 
Detailed path 
description 
 Social integration allows team 
cohesion, avoid subgrouping & 
isolation 
 Social integration stems from 
surface-level (e.g., gender) & deep-
level (e.g., values) characteristics, 
which includes supplementary 
(similar) & complementary 
(dissimilar) fit between teammates 
 Teammates have diverse skills & 
expertise, & operate in a multi-team 
system 
 Composition influences team 
emergent states (e.g., shared 
cognition) & team processes (e.g., 
coordination), & available skills & 
expertise 
Study findings  Analogs: Social integration related 
to value similarity; personality 
compatibility; dominance 
(avoidance of multiple dominant 
members); similarity in attitudes, 
interest; sex, age, & nationality 
diversity; & other (e.g., need for 
affiliation) 
 Analogs: Composition related to 
conscientiousness, need for 
autonomy, shared interests and 
activities, values, need for 
affiliation, all-female crew 
 Traditional teams: Composition 
related to shared cognition, info 
sharing, transactive memory system 
Note: Adapted from Bell et al., 2015. Paths are not mutually exclusive.  
 
Team composition may also consider team cognitive processes stemming from individual 
cognitive capabilities. Similarity of values, skills, experiences, and personality naturally 
establishes a measure of shared mental models, which is related to teamwork and team 
performance (DeChurch & Mesmer-Magnus, 2010a) (Category I). However, team members with 
a uniformly high level of agreeableness may risk creating a team which engages in group-think, 
or lacks the ability to generate creative solutions to problems due to the lack of divergent 
thinking (Fiore et al., 2015) (Category III). Thus, the proper balance of different characteristics is 
needed to ensure that any given personality type does not dominate the group. Preliminary 
analyses of Antarctic Station crews examined combinations of personality related to outcomes on 
a team-based cooperative task (Roma, Hursch, & Hienz, 2015) (Category II). Low conscientious 
and high agreeableness teams were the most cooperative and most productive. Selecting 
individuals more likely to engage in teamwork activities also fosters development and 
maintenance of a shared mental model. Meta-analysis of general field studies report a team 
minimum level of agreeableness is a strong predictor of team performance, as is team mean 
conscientiousness, openness, collectivism, and importantly, preference for teamwork (Bell, 
2007) (Category I). While some characteristics related to team cognition should be the focus of 
selection and team composition, other skills and shared cognitions can be developed through 
training, especially training as a unit (Fiore et al., 2015).  
 
Summary points related to ground-based evidence and team composition: 
 Cultural diversity should be recognized and managed through selection and training of 
shared knowledge and adaptable, agreeable, team-oriented team members.  
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 Algorithms are needed to compose future LDEM teams, balancing personalities, 
technical skills, and other individual differences (e.g., gender, nationality, values). 
o Faultlines and tokenism should be avoided. 
  
Countermeasures related to selection and team composition 
Future LDEM will require simultaneous consideration of a multitude of factors when composing 
the mission team. Acknowledging the importance of skills for taskwork, avoiding faultlines 
whenever possible is necessary (Bell et al., 2015) (Category III). Analog and analog population 
studies highlight several key composition factors that must be addressed through selection and 
training: cross-cultural issues, sex/gender, values/attitudes/interests, personality (especially 
assertiveness/dominance, extraversion), professional background such as military experience, 
and specialized expertise such as physician vs. geologist. Currently, NASA has no formalized 
process to compose mission teams from a scientific perspective, but this is an identified need for 
future exploration missions. Roscosmos has employed Homeostat and other methods to research 
crew compatibility (Kanas et al., 2009). Development of composition algorithms, which weight 
many individual and team factors according to the predicted influence on team performance and 
functioning, is one potential countermeasure. Potential teams formed by the algorithm may also 
undergo a trial period or engage in team activities and assessments to determine fit and 
effectiveness prior to mission launch. Past spaceflight simulations such as the Mars 105 utilized 
several individual and group assessments to select interpersonally compatible crewmates 
(Vinokhodova, Gushchin, Eskov, & Khananashvili, 2012), and HI-SEAS employed NOLS to 
familiarize potential team members with each other so that they were able to report preferences 
for who they wanted to crew with to the facility’s investigators picking the final crew. Training 
together for an extended period of time, including time in ICE environments, will ensure the 
team has progressed through the forming and norming stages pre-flight and will give trainers 
time to address any teamwork issues in-person and with real-time communications available. In 
so doing, shared team cognition will be given time to develop. Teams will likely be cross-trained 
to increase the likelihood of mission success if a team member becomes unable to perform, 
which will provide additional avenues of commonality between crew members to prevent 
faultlines.  
 
Establishing procedures and team standards regarding everything from taskwork (e.g., roles, 
workload, schedules, conflict resolution) to living conditions (e.g., hygiene, recreation, humor, 
treating others with respect) sets a new team norm that may supersede potential faultlines (Kanas 
et al., 2009; (Stuster, 2011) (Category III). Educating individuals on various differences such as 
norms regarding leadership and power distance, trust, conflict resolution, and communication, is 
an important first step, but selection of team members with traits such as openness and 
adaptability is another area for research. At minimum, teams must be trained in common 
languages to facilitate communication.  English is the declared language for the ISS Program; 
however, all NASA, CSA, ESA and JAXA astronauts learn Russian. Language barriers in the 
SFINCSS negatively affected communication and team functioning (Sandal, 2004) (Category 
III) and, as seen in the Mars 105, may exacerbate team tensions (Sandal, Bye, & van de Vijver, 
2011). Every effort must be made to integrate the team and address any conflicts prior to launch; 
the current practice of training separately for much of the run-up to launch date must change for 
future LDEMs.  
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c. Team Autonomy, Communication, and the Multi-Team System 
Team autonomy in workplace teams has been linked with higher performance in meta-analyses 
(e.g., Stewart, 2006) (Category I) and in longitudinal studies (Cordery, Morrison, Wright, & 
Wall, 2010) (Category II). Several spaceflight analog studies have examined team autonomy in a 
MTS, and the subsequent effects on psychosocial outcomes and team cohesion. A set of studies 
examining high vs. low autonomy at simulation analogs NEEMO, Haughton-Mars, and 
Mars105, found that high autonomy conditions were deemed safe, with no adverse effects, and 
mission objectives were met (Kanas et al., 2013) (Category II). Crews in high autonomy reported 
positive moods and greater creativity, but analog MCCs reported role confusion as crews became 
more autonomous. There were also some nuanced differences between analogs. For example, 
NEEMO mission commanders offered more direction and were less fatigued in high autonomy 
conditions. High autonomy in Haughton-Mars resulted in greater cohesion, when compared to 
data from Mir/ISS MCC members. High autonomy at Mars105 was created by allowing the crew 
more discretion to plan activities and by instituting a 20-minute one-way communication delay. 
Crew morale and cohesion was high throughout the mission, and mission objectives were 
completed. Russian crew members, compared to European crew members, had a bigger change 
in work pressure scores in the high autonomy condition, but European crew members had higher 
scores in both conditions. The researchers attribute this finding somewhat to the fact that this was 
a Russian analog with a Russian commander. Russian and European crew members experienced 
changes in opposite directions when moving from the low and high autonomy conditions on 
factors of commander support and direction (Europeans increased), expressiveness (Europeans 
increased), cohesion (Europeans decreased), and autonomy (Europeans increased). Leader 
support was related to cohesion for both the crew and for MCC. Related to MTS, negative mood, 
tension, and anger from the crew was displaced to the MCC. Other research from the Mars 105 
found that one group of subjects in the high autonomy condition began to practice closed (vs 
active) communications, which was correlated to lower scores of mood and activity (Gushin, 
Vinokhodova, Vasylieva, Nitchiporuk, & Balazs, 2012) (Category II).  
 
Another set of studies using a lab simulation of a mission with an MCC, examined participants 
trained over a long duration of several months on a three-person, team-based planetary 
exploration task (Roma et al., 2013) (Category II). After the extensive training, teams then 
performed a “mission” for 3-4 hours. Subjects were placed into conditions of low (i.e., MCC 
schedule dictated activities) or high autonomy (i.e., team determined schedule) from MCC, and 
in a second experiment, an additional manipulation either had teams with full communication to 
MCC or experience a loss of communication. Both studies saw better performance of collecting 
higher quality geologic samples in high autonomy conditions. Regarding psychosocial factors, 
high autonomy teams reported more positive moods and researchers found lower cortisol 
production reflecting lower levels of stress, and increased socially-referent language, which the 
researchers suggest is an indicator of enhanced affiliation and cohesion. These findings are 
related to meta-analytic work highlighting the role of empowering leadership to increase team 
empowerment over their work and decision-making, which leads to better performance 
(Maynard, Gilson, O’Boyle, & Cigularov, 2013) (Category I). Leader behaviors or management 
structure (e.g., MCC providing more autonomy to the field crew) empowers the team such that 
they experience greater feelings of competence, autonomy, and meaningfulness in their work. 
Other times, autonomy and empowerment may be a natural element of the environment. 
ANSMET requires a teams of 4-8 members to live together, on the ice, in tents, away from 
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immediate medical attention, for several weeks, with limited communication, while surveying 
and collecting meteorites in the field (Love & Harvey, 2014). ANSMET teams create their own 
schedules, task assignments, prioritization, and manage resources and equipment; they do not 
rely on a control center. Preliminary studies benchmarking cohesion dynamics of these high 
autonomy teams found that each team had its own ecology; that is, cohesion was observed to be 
stable and high for one team, while another team experienced more fluctuation over the duration 
(Kozlowski, Chang, & Biswas, 2015) (Category III). Thus, while workplace teams see a clear 
pattern of increased autonomy leading to empowerment, in turn leading to improved job 
satisfaction, commitment, health outcomes, and task and contextual performance (including team 
empowerment predicting team effectiveness) (Seibert, Wang, & Courtright, 2011) (Category I) 
consideration of a specific mission team may require countermeasures attuned to their specific 
needs.  
 
Team autonomy is not always desired, especially in high consequence environments when 
remotely located experts are needed to solve a problem that requires fast action. However, 
communication delays may interfere with the problem-solving process. When coordination is 
needed in a communication delayed MTS, one countermeasure approach to mitigate the negative 
effects of communication delays is to utilize communication protocols. Studies in NEEMO under 
varying lengths of communication delays found that crews and MCC were talking past each 
other, that is, they were responding to messages out of order, confusing which responses 
corresponded to which communications and responding to actions that were outdated (Palinkas, 
2012). During an emergency medical simulation under the 5 minute condition, the safety of a 
crewmember would have been compromised due to communication delays between the flight 
surgeon and the crew had the medical emergency been real. Even during typical communication 
conditions or within team communications, miscommunication and failures to communicate 
have been cited as a contributing factor in transportation accidents and medical errors (NTSB 
[National Transportation Safety Board], 1994; Baker, Day, & Salas, 2006; McKeon, Oswaks, & 
Cunningham, 2006, Powell & Hill, 2006) (Category III). Other factors include poor teamwork, 
coordination, and tactical decision-making, and interpersonal conflicts, which may all be 
negatively affected by communication problems. MTS teams may develop feelings of in-
group/out-group, as has happened with remotely located exploration crews and command centers 
(Stuster, 2010). HI-SEAS crews under 20 minute communication delays report that crew-ground 
disconnect is a significant problem (Binsted, 2015), and Mars 500 participants reported conflicts 
between crew-ground at a rate five times greater than within crew conflicts (Basner et al., 2014) 
(Category III). Training to recognize symptoms of potential conflict mitigated this negative 
effect somewhat. Crews in HERA began to decrease the use of politeness strategies in conditions 
of communication delay (Wu, Miller, Schmer-Galunder, Ott, & Rye, 2015). A review of 
communication delay studies across several mission simulation analogs (NEEMO, D-RATS, 
RATS 2012, underwater Pavilion Lake, Autonomous Mission Operations project) concluded that 
communication delay was a significant hindrance to MTS performance and created negative 
attitudinal responses (Love & Reagan, 2013) (Category III). Identified challenges include 
confusion of sequence, interrupted calls, wasted time, impaired ability to provide relevant 
information, confusion regarding who has heard what communication, perception of 
indifference, slow response to events, and reduced situational awareness. Obvious threats to team 
coordination, cooperation, performance, and psychosocial outcomes are inherent in those 
challenges.  
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Countermeasures related to team autonomy, communication, and the multi-team system 
A recommendation from participants in these analogs suggested that training on, and utilization 
of, established communication protocols is one way to mitigate negative effects. To meet this 
need and alleviate the biases of synchronous communication, communication using text and 
verbal protocols were tested in NEEMO and HERA missions (Fischer & Mosier, 2015) 
(Category II) and a lab study (Category I). Voice protocols segmented a call into initiating with a 
call sign, stating the topic and keeping track of threads of communications, chunking the 
message body, and ending a call with “Over”. In addition, conventions were established related 
to stating the time of the call, logging calls, transmitting non-critical calls at appropriate times, 
acknowledging all communications, and building in transmission efficiencies (e.g., announcing 
ahead of time when calls will be transmitted to ready the receiving group). Lab findings showed 
protocol elements decreased errors and predicted task successes, while analog findings showed 
protocols were effective and mitigated the negative impacts of comm delays. Other conclusions 
suggested text communications were better for routine, non-time critical communication, voice 
supported team-building, and some protocol elements (i.e., topic, acknowledgement, repeating 
critical info, logging messages, giving a heads up) were more critical than others. 
 
There are several other team factors that may offer an avenue for countermeasure development in 
the form of selection/composition, training, and tools. Social support and leader support are 
important for improving team performance outcomes and team functioning (e.g., cohesion, 
cooperation, and empowerment) and these factors may facilitate transition between levels of 
autonomy, different tasks, and different roles (e.g., leader, follower) (Smith-Jentsch, 2015). 
Within analog teams, team members report bringing up common ground topics to open lines of 
communication within diverse groups (Tafforin, 2013) (Category III), but this rapport building 
and social support is constrained between comm delayed groups. Autonomous teams, especially 
in conditions of comm delay, are in danger of losing shared cognitions and awareness with other 
teams across the MTS. However, one Mars 105 reported that groupthink did not develop among 
the crew (Sandal et al., 2011) (Category III). In addition to these cognitive process decrements, a 
Mars 500 study found cognitive performance decrements of attention and alertness related to 
fatigue and stress (Basner et al., 2014) (Category III), further threatening team cognition. Trends 
reveal negative effects to several individual-level cognition factors (e.g., attention, central 
executive functioning, psychomotor functioning, reasoning ability) due to ICE factors of 
isolation, microgravity, radiation, and fatigue (Fiore et al., 2015). Shared mental models are a 
well-established predictor of team performance, regardless of measurement method (DeChurch 
& Mesmer-Magnus, 2010b) (Category I). Another NASA review of shared mental models in the 
LDEM context found shared team cognitive processes are strongly positively related to the 
quality of communication, coordination, performance, member satisfaction, and viability; and 
suggested that this shared knowledge must be developed and updated before, and regularly, 
during a mission (DeChurch & Mesmer-Magnus, 2015) (Category III). Composing a team of 
resilient crewmembers as well as training them on self-monitoring and techniques to adapt to 
changing conditions, high autonomy, conflicts, and isolation may mitigate performance and 
functioning decrements. As is common call in team LDEM research, little is known regarding 
these effects over time.  
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Summary points related to ground-based evidence and team autonomy, communication, and the 
multi-team system: 
 Team autonomy leads to better performance, lower stress, positive mood, greater 
cohesion, health outcomes, etc., but it may lead to negative outcomes such as groupthink. 
o However, there may be some nuanced differences stemming from culture.  
 Communication delays negatively affect team performance, coordination, decision-
making, and teamwork, and interpersonal conflicts, within a team and across the multi-
team system. 
 Countermeasures show promise to mitigate the risk to team performance and multi-team 
coordination from communication delays. Examples include communication protocols, 
selection and composition algorithms to form complementary and well-functioning 
teams, and training related to developing shared mental models, self-monitoring and 
adaptability. 
 
d. Team Skills Training 
Team skills training relies on a large and robust body of research. The temporal display (Gregory 
et al., 2013; Table 3) discussed previously is backed by substantial evidence from this training 
literature. Once the process structure for developing a team training program is known, attention 
can turn to determining which skills are most appropriate. Evidence indicates that two facets of 
training are relevant to team performance and functioning: (1) individual training on teamwork 
and interpersonal skills, and (2) time training as a team.  
 
i. Training the individual to be on a team 
There are many individual traits or skills that enable a person to function well in a team. Recall 
the job analysis identification of communication and teamwork competencies (Barrett et al., 
2015). ASCANs are selected based on minimum requirements in these competencies, however, 
extensive training on general communication and teamwork, and the NASA-specific 
communication and teamwork styles (e.g., protocols, techniques, terminology, tactical skills) 
begins after selection. Training the individual to be on a spaceflight team assumes astronauts 
possess these minimum requirements, and the goal of training then becomes optimizing the 
individual’s performance and related team performance. Additionally, trainees must have basic 
skills to do the task, before training teamwork skills (Salas, Burke, & Cannon-Bowers, 2002), 
similar to ASCAN technical training that requires an ASCAN to reach proficiency in a skill or 
task before training team skills. A meta-analysis of 97 studies, involving 11 different types of 
interventions (Guzzo, Jette, & Katzell, 1985) (Category I) found that training and goal-setting are 
the most effective organizational interventions that are aimed at increasing motivation and 
individual performance. Branches of the U.S. military, an analogous population that also spends 
a great deal of time and resources on training, offer other supporting examples. Leedom and 
Simon (1995) found that providing United States Air Force (USAF) aviators with standardized, 
behavior-based training on teamwork increased team coordination and improved team task 
performance. In a field study of 92 teams (1,158 team members) in a USAF officer development 
program, Hirschfield, Jordan, Field, Giles, and Armenakis (2006) (Category III) found that team 
member mastery of teamwork knowledge predicted better team task proficiency and higher 
observer ratings of effective teamwork. Salas, Shuffler, Thayer, Bedwell, and Lazzara (2012, cf. 
Gregory et al., 2013) identified six team competencies: cooperation, conflict, coordination, 
communication, coaching/leadership, and cognition. Individual competencies identified in the 
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astronaut job analysis (Barrett et al., 2015) may be mapped onto the team competencies to 
provide a clear picture of how to train individuals to be well-functioning team members and how 
to train the intact team to work well together, in addition to selecting team-oriented and 
motivated individuals possessing preferred personality characteristics.  
 
The six team competencies, from the perspective of an individual’s contribution to the team, are 
related to spaceflight teams as follows:  
 
Cooperation (from an individual perspective) 
Cooperation is an attitudinal and efficacy element of teamwork. In the individual sense, training 
can work to motivate individuals to work on a team and participate in cooperative and supporting 
behaviors. Training basic understanding and skills related to supporting behaviors is needed. 
Supporting behaviors are one aspect of the Team Dimensional Training, which led to better 
performance in military and flight controller populations (Bedwell et al., 2012; Smith-Jentsch, 
Cannon-Bowers, Tannenbaum, & Salas, 2008) (Category II). Building confidence and self-
efficacy through successful performance, gradual skill attainment, and reinforcing feedback 
during training programs can also enhance the individual propensity for cooperation. Self-
efficacy was positively, moderately related to work performance through a meta-analysis of over 
20,000 individuals (Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998) (Category I). Cooperation may also encompass 
aspects of self-care such that the individual is motivated to stay in good psychological and 
physical health for the good of the team by exercising, eating a nutritious diet, getting adequate 
sleep, avoiding or managing injuries, and practicing stress reduction techniques. Thus, related 
trainings on these skills is also important. Finally, cooperation (and conflict management, below) 
was identified as an important aspect of group living, which is an important part of spaceflight 
(Kanas & Manzey, 2008) (Category IV). When each individual is effectively recognizing and 
managing his or her needs, the team can trust that everyone will perform as expected when 
needed.  
 
Conflict management (from an individual perspective) 
Relationship conflict strongly, negatively affects team performance and team member 
satisfaction according to meta-analytic findings across 116 studies (de Wit, Greer, & Jehn, 2012) 
(Category I). In addition, the negative relationship between conflict and team performance is 
stronger during highly complex tasks. Astronauts engage in many complex tasks requiring 
teamwork and team decision-making. Conflict management training is currently a part of the 
ASCAN training flow, and is used to teach the individual about “fighting fair”, managing 
emotions, de-escalating conflicts, and managing expectations to prevent future conflict. Training 
may also consider disagreements about taskwork or interpersonal relationships, and may teach 
preemptive and reactive strategies to address conflict (Marks, Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 2001).  
 
Coordination (from an individual perspective) 
Coordination training may involve aspects of cross-training individuals on multiple roles so that 
they understand and anticipate the actions and needs of other team members. Shared knowledge 
facilitates the development of shared mental models. Conversely, coordination requires 
communication, and in a complex multi-team setting, this communication may take many forms 
(e.g., verbal or text person-person, person-group, digital indicators to person or group). This flow 
of information establishes and maintains situation awareness. Each individual on the team must 
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have enough shared understanding of each other and the tasks, and the proper communication 
skills to plan and execute coordinated activities. Adaptation training will also allow individuals 
to adapt to the actions of others and maintain coordinated processes. Cross-training and 
adaptation training improves performance (Salas et al., 2008) (Category I). 
 
Communication (from an individual perspective) 
Training a common language is a first step. Training other context-specific terms (e.g., EVA) 
and norms (e.g, the phonetic alphabet, sequence of initiating a call with “Houston, Station” to 
indicate who is calling who) is a second. Much of this may require traditional, rote memorization 
and practice. Individuals should also train in the SFRM communication-related skills of 
information exchange and communication delivery, which involves packaging information into 
concise segments, pushing accurate information at the right time, and active listening. For NASA 
and other astronauts, T-38 training reinforces short, concise transmission of information 
providing a familiar framework for their mission training and operations. In critical situations 
such as medical teamwork, effective communication is open, accurate, and concise (Salas, 
Wilson, Murphy, King, & Salisbury, 2008) (Category IV). Failure to practice CRM 
communication techniques in the aviation industry has led to many fatal incidents (Helmreich & 
Foushee, 2010) (Category III). Individual knowledge should also be built around protocols and 
other NASA developed countermeasures, such as the Fischer-Mosier protocols tested in lab and 
mission simulation analogs, that are developed to address communication delays (Fischer & 
Mosier, 2015) (Category II). This training should apply to all individuals within the multi-team 
system for a standardization of knowledge and procedures. 
 
Coaching, Leadership/Followership (from an individual perspective) 
Leadership, especially leadership in an ICE environment with a highly autonomous team, must 
consider a range of unique factors which go beyond the typical leadership development programs 
in organizations of conflict management, consensus building, forecasting and planning, 
communication, emotional regulation, and fostering cohesion. A literature review and operations 
assessment of leadership for the LDEM context offers several evidence-based suggestions 
(Gibson et al., 2015) (Category III). While there are identified mission commanders, a diversity 
of complex tasks for an LDEM will require a diversity of expertise, and thus, role switching from 
leader to follower as the situation and task demands. Appropriate switching calls for shared 
knowledge of each team member’s knowledge, skills, abilities (KSAs), on which each team 
member should be well-versed during training. A leader must also assume different types of 
leadership, whether it is collective, dyadic-oriented, socio-emotional or crisis-response as 
dictated by the situation, and training programs should include modules on each of these 
leadership models. Preparation for identifying which type of leadership is needed and when to 
make the appropriate switch should be trained, but may also be supported through MCC and 
automated monitoring for potential role conflicts and prompting switches. Thus, other teams in 
the MTS should be trained on this information, and all should be trained on any monitoring 
technologies. Consideration of cultural differences in the MTS is also a concern. Personnel from 
ESA and spaceflight analogs stated that some leaders are able to step back into a follower role 
more easily than others, and the ease seems to differ by cultural power distance (Burke & 
Feitosa, 2015) (Category III).  
 
Cognition (from an individual perspective) 
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Many aspects of individual cognition affecting performance and interpersonal interactions is 
covered by the BMed research portfolio. However, a review of both individual and team 
cognition in a sample of 168 observations from spaceflight, analogs, and analogous populations 
such as the military suggests that individual cognitive processes are nested in and contribute to 
team-level processes (Fiore et al., 2015) (Category III). Thus, training targeted to developing 
individual attention, memory, and reasoning is the foundation for team cognitive training. For 
shared mental models, accuracy of the mental model is more important than the degree of 
agreement between team members’ mental models (Edwards, Day, Arthur, & Bell, 2006) 
(Category I). Training each team member to possess an accurate mental model, which can later 
be shared in whole-team training, can improve performance. This is particularly important in 
unfamiliar or unexpected situations in which shared mental models facilitate team problem-
solving. In addition, stress inoculation training, which has found support in emergency response 
and military domains, is another important component of cognitive training that may mitigate the 
negative effect of stress on performance found in long duration spaceflight (Palinkas, 2007) 
(Category III).  
 
ii. Training the team 
Training the six team competencies at the team level is the second approach to team training. A 
meta-analytic review of team training found a positive relationship with team outcomes across 
five categories of team effectiveness: affective (e.g., affect towards the team or leaders, collective 
efficacy, cooperation), cognitive (e.g., development of shared mental models), subjective-based 
skill (e.g., ratings of performance, effectiveness, combat readiness by team member or SMEs), 
objective task-based skill (e.g., points in a simulation game, task errors, time), and teamwork skill 
(e.g., conflict management, quality of process, information exchange, coordination, leadership) 
(Delise, Gorman, Brooks, Rentsch, & Steele-Johnson, 2010) (Category I). Furthermore, the 
meta-analysis found these results held true for both civilian and military teams in team training. 
Thus, team training may directly enhance both team competencies and technical skills, which 
significantly influence team effectiveness. For future LDEMs, teams must have time to train 
together as an intact team to apply the skills they each bring to the table or have learned as 
individuals in the larger team setting. In other words, teams must have ample time to “storm” and 
“norm” so that they can begin “performing” as a team prior to launch (Schmidt, 2015) (Category 
IV).   
 
The six team competencies, from a team-level perspective, are related to spaceflight teams as 
follows: 
 
Cooperation (from the team perspective) 
Team building, as established through meta-analysis, is an effective method for developing 
affective and team process outcomes (Klein et al., 2009) (Category I) including cooperation. 
Mutual trust, collective efficacy, and a shared feeling of psychological safety are all aspects of 
this competency that can be developed during training. A study of adventure racing teams, an 
analogous population, found preparation effort was related to collective efficacy (Edmonds, 
Tenenbaum, Kamata, & Johnson, 2009). An initial lab validation study of a group cooperation 
task, found that individual incentives decreased team cooperation (Roma, Hursh, Goswami, 
Kumar, Kaimakamis, & Golemis, 2015). Expanding this work in ICE analogs found that fairness 
measured on a group index was generally high, with some exception by team, and fluctuated 
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some over the mission. Morale was positively related to cooperative behaviors. Thus, training 
may use team-based incentives tied to task performance to encourage cooperation, and build 
morale, trust, and positive affect within the team. 
 
Conflict Management (from the team perspective) 
Recent studies have reported the occurrence of team conflicts in analogs such as the Mars 105 
and Mars 500 (Basner et al., 2014; Sandal et al., 2011; Vinokhodova, et al., 2012) (Category III). 
A greater frequency of conflicts is generally associated with more stress, increases in errors, and 
decreases in productivity (Alper et al., 2000). In a review of 55 studies, Rasmussen and Jeppesen 
(2006) (Category III) noted that every study found that the more time team members spent in 
training together, the fewer conflicts and conflict-related performance deficiencies the team 
members experienced. Thus, teaching conflict management skills is not the only important 
consideration; training time together provides an opportunity for the team to learn teammates’ 
strengths and weakness, patterns of thinking and working, and achieve success in practice 
simulations. Simulations allow teams to practice realistic conditions and learn how their 
teammates behave in nominal and unexpected situations. This performance success and 
development of shared knowledges may lead to greater cohesion, and in turn, performance. In 
multinational teams, faultlines may be a cause of conflict. A review of the literature showed that 
surface-level differences (e.g., demographics) negatively impact the short-term performance of 
teams as these teams initially experience more interpersonal conflict, but these differences have 
less impact on performance the longer that the teams are together (Mannix & Neale, 2005) 
(Category III). Deep-level diversity negatively impacts long-term performance only when teams 
are not provided with the training and incentives to manage interpersonal conflicts. When 
training and incentives for managing diversity are provided, deep-level diversity helps teams to 
maintain moderate amounts of the positive task conflict that supports team performance. Giving 
teams ample time in which to train together and instructions on how to take advantage of 
multiple perspectives reduces the odds of interpersonal conflict stemming from either surface or 
deep-level diversity and increases the ability of teams to leverage the task conflict. 
 
Coordination (from the team perspective) 
Training coordination at the team level must incorporate a great deal of developing and 
maintaining shared mental models during a dynamic situation. Military applications with naval 
teams in an anti-air warfare simulation and other teams in a simulated aerial vehicle command 
and control task found that stress and adaptability training resulted in better team coordination, 
and teams were more resilient to stress, and performed better (Entin & Serfaty, 1999; Gorman et 
al., 2010) (Category II). Training on other tools that support coordination (e.g., checklists, which 
are used extensively in spaceflight and aviation) may be another way to reduce coordination 
errors (Love & Bleacher, 2013).  
 
Communication (from the team perspective) 
Communication amongst team members must operate along standard procedures, for example, 
knowing when and how to push and pull information to and from the right people. Cultural 
norms may influence communications such that individuals from high power distance cultures or 
collectivist cultures may not speak up to a commander or when a statement runs counter to the 
rest of the team. Analog environment studies and surveys of the European Space Agency 
personnel found the cultural differences in non-verbal communication and language can 
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negatively influence team functioning (Sandal, Leon, & Palinkas, 2006, Sandal & Manzey, 
2009) (Category III); thus, training a new, mutually agreed-upon team norm to supersede other 
existing communication norms is important. Determining a standard operational language for the 
mission is also important. Debrief protocols are another way to prompt discussion after a training 
or periodically during the life-cycle of the team to maintain shared cognition. Training with 
military and flight controllers found that communication skills were improved, which translated 
to improved performance (Bedwell et al., 2012) (Category II), and another debrief protocol 
tested in NEEMO and HERA analogs and in a lab study found it generated constructive 
discussions and was related to team effectiveness (Tannenbaum, Mathieu, Alliger, Cerasoli, & 
Donsbach, 2015) (Category II,III). 
 
Coaching, Leadership/Followership (from the team perspective) 
Team-level leadership/followership training must be an extension of the individual leadership 
skills training such that the team may practice identifying situations, identifying the appropriate 
leader for that situation, identifying the appropriate leadership model for the situation, stepping 
forward or back into leader and follower roles, and coordinating these switches with MCC as 
needed under conditions of autonomy and communication delay similar to future LDEM. 
Development of leadership/followership skills is more effective if trained regularly over a long 
period of time, with multiple opportunities to practice skills and receive feedback.  
 
Cognition (from the team perspective) 
Cognition emphasizes the benefit of cross-training to create strategic redundancies of role, task, 
and teammate knowledge among teammates. For example, in a study of submarine attack crews, 
shared mental models and knowledge concerning team members adds to the number of hits on 
target, over and above the contribution from operational skills (Espevik, Johnsen, Eid, & Thayer, 
2006) (Category II). The more experience crews had working together, the less physiological 
arousal the crew experienced during attack simulations, indicating lower stress levels. Team 
debriefs are another effective countermeasure used extensively in the military and aviation 
environments as part of team training facilitating meta-cognitive processes, or thinking about 
cognition and behaviors. A meta-analysis of 46 samples (N=2,136) found that teams utilizing 
team debriefs performed 20-25% better, aligning and structuring teams (Tannenbaum & 
Cerasoli, 2013) (Category I). Debriefs facilitate evaluation of cognitions and actions taken in 
order to improve for the future. When a team engages in this self-evaluation process they benefit 
from maintaining shared cognitions of the right course of action, and enhance problem-solving 
and communication processes. As seen in studies of Team Dimensional Training, flight 
controllers and military populations were able to use team debriefs of teamwork skills to enhance 
learning and decrease performance errors (Bedwell et al., 2012; Smith-Jentsch et al., 2008) 
(Category II). Another debrief method for LDEM that has been tested in NEEMO, HERA, and 
lab settings also focuses on teamwork, taskwork, and resilience, and as an added benefit to 
isolated teams, this debrief method can be led by the team (Tannenbaum et al., 2015) (Category 
II,III). This DebriefNow tool allows teams to individually and anonymously answer questions 
and the software is able to produce a customized discussion guide to prompt the team. The team 
owns the process and can adjust or begin a debrief as desired. Results found that this debrief 
method was well-received, and effectively improved performance and resilience. It was also 
found that resilience was positively related to performance, and that this relationship became 
stronger over time.  
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iii. Training methods 
Many methods exist for training teams. A recent review of team cognition across 168 
studies/observations in spaceflight analogs and analogous populations summarized the various 
training strategies that were appropriate for training team knowledges, skills, and attitudes (see 
Table 5) (Fiore et al., 2015). Future LDEM training programs may use this as a guide to ensure 
elements of the relevant individual and team competencies are addressed through the appropriate 
training strategies. The effect size of different training strategies varied according to one meta-
analysis, such that team knowledge training was the most effective (effect size =.81) followed by 
tactical training (effect size =.67), critical thinking (effect size =.60), team adaption and 
coordination (effect size =.56), coordination/crew resource management (effect size =.47), cross-
training (effect size =.44), self-guided training (effect size =.36), and self-correction training 
(effect size =.27) (Salas et al., 2008, cf. Fiore et al., 2015) (Category I). Overall, team training 
was found to have a moderate, positive effect on outcomes of team performance and functioning 
(effect size = .34). For specific methods, best practices dictate that trainees receive information 
or declarative knowledge about that skill or task, observe demonstration of the skill or task, 
practice that skill or task, and receive feedback when performing the skill or task (Salas, 
Tannenbaum, Kraiger, & Smith-Jentsch, 2012) (Category IV). A brief explanation of each 
training strategy follows: 
 
 Event-Based Training / Scenario-Based Training – teams work through specific scenarios 
to practice specific skills 
 Self-Correction Training / Guided Self-Correction Training – teams review past 
performance, self-evaluate, and devise plans for improving 
 Cross-Training –team members are trained on all positions through information sharing, 
demonstration and modeling, and hands-on rotation through other positions 
 Stress Training – teams are taught to recognize stress in the self and teammates, and 
practice relaxation and other stress-reduction and coping methods 
 Team Adaptation and Coordination Training – teams are exposed to examples of high-
performing and low-performing teams adapting to stressful scenarios, practice scenarios, 
and receive feedback              
 Team Building – team activities meant to build trust and cohesion 
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Table 5.  Summary of training strategies, delivery methods and associated knowledge, skills, and 
attitudes. 
Training 
Strategy 
Method Knowledge Skills Attitudes 
Event-Based 
Training / 
Scenario-Based 
training 
 Simulation 
 Paper-and-
Pencil Vignettes 
 Role Play 
 Embedded 
Instructional 
Agent 
 Task Knowledge1,2,3,5,6,7 
 Equipment Knowledge/ 
Technology Model1,2,3,5,6,7 
 Characteristics1,2,3,5,6,7 
 Situation Awareness4, 5,7,8 
 Team Interaction 
Knowledge1,3,5,6,7 
 Transactive Memory 
Systems2,3,5,6,7 
 Larger Mission2,5,7 
 Constraints5,6 
 Mission Analysis9,10,11 
 Goal Specification9,10,11 
 Planning9,10,11 
 Mutual Performance 
Monitoring9,10,11 
 Monitoring Goal 
Progress9,10,11 
 Systems Monitoring9,10,11 
 Task Structuring9,10,11 
 Adaptability9,10,11 
 Conflict Resolution9,10,11 
 Assertiveness9,10,11 
 Boundary Spanning9,10,11 
 Team Leadership9,10,11 
 Stress Management9,10,11 
 Decision Making9,10,11 
 Affect Management9,10,11 
 Compensatory 
Behavior9,10,11 
 Information Exchange9,10,11 
 Motivating9,10,11 
 Intra-team Feedback9,10,11 
 Coordination9,10,11 
 Cooperation9,10,11 
 Flight Skill9,10,11 
 Navigation9,10,11 
 Risk Assessment9,10,11 
 Visual Scanning9,10,11 
 Handoffs9,10,11 
 Teamwork9,10,11 
 Risk 
Perception12, 13 
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Training 
Strategy 
Method Knowledge Skills Attitudes 
Self-Correction 
Training / 
Guided Self-
Correction 
Training 
 Lectures 
 Behavioral 
Modeling 
 Use of 
structured after 
action reviews 
 Simulation 
 Task Knowledge1,2,3,5,6,7 
 Equipment Knowledge/ 
Technology Model1,2,3,5,6,7 
  
 Teammate 
Characteristics1,2,3,5,6,7 
 Situation Awareness4, 5,7,8 
 Team Interaction 
Knowledge1,3,5,6,7 
 Transactive Memory 
Systems2,3,5,6,7 
 Larger Mission2,5,7 
 Constraints5,6 
 Mission Analysis9,10,11 
 Goal Specification9,10,11 
 Strategy Formulation9,10,11 
 Mutual Performance 
Monitoring9,10,11 
 Monitoring Goal 
Progress9,10,11 
 Systems Monitoring9,10,11 
 Task Structuring9,10,11 
 Adaptability9,10,11 
 Conflict Resolution9,10,11 
 Assertiveness9,10,11 
 Boundary Spanning9,10,11 
 Team Leadership9,10,11 
 Stress Management9,10,11 
 Decision Making9,10,11 
 Affect Management9,10,11 
 Compensatory 
Behavior9,10,11 
 Information Exchange9,10,11 
 Motivating9,10,11 
 Intra-team Feedback9,10,11 
 Coordination9,10,11 
 Cooperation9,10,11 
 Flight Skill9,10,11 
 Navigation9,10,11 
 Risk Assessment9,10,11 
 Visual Scanning9,10,11 
 Handoffs9,10,11 
 Teamwork9,10,11 
 Risk 
Perception12, 
13,14 
 Motivation12, 13 
 Trust12, 13 
 Loyalty12, 13 
 Team 
Satisfaction12 
 Cohesion12, 13 
 Team 
Psychological 
Safety12, 13 
 Affect12, 13, 14 
 Collective 
Efficacy12, 13 
 Team 
Commitment12, 
13 
 Trust in 
Automation12, 13 
Cross-Training  Lectures 
 Role Play 
 Behavioral 
Modeling 
 Paper-based 
vignettes 
 Simulation 
based vignettes 
 Embedded 
Instructional 
Agents 
 Task Knowledge1,2,3,5,6,7 
 Equipment Knowledge/ 
Technology Model1,2,3,5,6,7 
 Teammate 
Characteristics1,2,3,5,6,7 
 Team Interaction 
Knowledge1,3,5,6,7 
 Transactive Memory 
Systems2,3,5,6,7 
 Adaptability9,10,11 
 Cooperation9,10,11 
 Coordination9,10,11 
 Decision Making9,10,11 
 
Stress Training  Lectures 
 Behavioral 
Modeling 
 Simulation 
 Vignettes 
 Embedded 
Agents 
 Mental Models1,2,3,4,5,6  Stress Management9,10,11 
 Affect Management9,10,11 
 Risk 
Perception12, 13 
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Training 
Strategy 
Method Knowledge Skills Attitudes 
Team 
Adaptation and 
Coordination 
Training 
 Lectures 
 Behavioral 
Modeling 
 Simulation 
 Team Interaction 
Knowledge1,3,5,6,7 
 Team Knowledge/ Team 
Characteristics 1,2,3,5,6,7 
 Monitoring9,10,11 
 Adaptability9,10,11 
 Compensatory 
Behavior9,10,11 
 Cooperation9,10,11 
 Coordination9,10,11 
 Teamwork skills9,10,11 
 Temporal patterns of team 
performance9,10,11 
 Collaboration9,10,11 
 Inter-team 
Communication9,10,11 
 Dynamic Reallocation of 
Functions9,10,11 
 Information Exchange9,10,11 
 Workload Distribution9,10,11 
 Collective 
Efficacy12, 13 
 Perceived 
Support12, 13 
Team Building  Role Play 
 Behavioral 
Modeling 
 Ropes Courses 
 Interactive 
Collaborative 
Exercises 
 Trust Games 
 Ice Breakers 
 N/A  Motivational Skill9,10,11  Motivation12, 13 
 Trust12, 13 
 Perceived 
Support12, 13 
 Loyalty12, 13 
 Team 
Satisfaction12 
 Cohesion12, 13 
 Team 
Psychological 
Safety12, 13 
Note. Adapted from Fiore et al., 2015. Superscript key detailing methods for evaluating listed KSAs: 1=Concept 
Map, 2=Card Sorts, 3=Pairwise Ratings, 4=Queries, 5=Questionnaires, 6=Verbal Protocols, 7=Communication 
Analysis, 8=Eye Trackers, 9=Questionnaires, 10=Communication Analysis, 11=Observation Scales, 
12=Questionnaires, 13=Communication Analysis, 14=Physiological 
 
Summary points related to ground-based evidence and team skills training: 
 Team skills training can occur at the individual level, to prepare an individual to be on a 
team, and at the team level, to create a coordinated and cohesive team.  
 Competencies from the updated astronaut job analysis can be tied to the six team 
competencies to delineate target areas for team skills training. These competencies have 
indirect and direct influences on team performance and team functioning.  
o Competencies include cooperation, conflict management, coordination, 
communication, leadership/followership, and cognition.  
 Training should be reinforced regularly, and use multiple methods to target the same 
skills. 
 
3. Other Predictors  
a. Team Net Habitable Volume 
Other contributing factors have received little to no research attention in the spaceflight context, 
for example net habitable volume (NHV) as it applies to the team. NHV is any volume left to the 
crew after accounting for volume needed for equipment, stowage, and structural inefficiencies 
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(NASA Human Integration Design Handbook, 2010). The Spaceflight Human Factors and 
Habitability Element of NASA’s HRP currently examines NHV from a human factors 
perspective, and a literature review has been conducted for the BMed factors related to 
confinement in a small space (see other relevant chapters in this Evidence Book for more 
information of NHV in the context of those Risk areas). Suggestions from a NASA SME 
workshop concluded that minimum acceptable NHV for a crew of 6 on a Mars mission is 25m3 
per person, which is significantly smaller than the ISS volume of 85m3 per person (Whitmire, 
Leveton, Broughton, Basner, Kearney, Ikuma, & Morris, 2015) (Category IV). This workshop 
committee approached NHV mainly from the perspective of needed space to engage in a variety 
of activities such as work, sleeping quarters, exercise, hygiene, and stowage. It also identified the 
need for dining and communal activity space to foster team cohesion, allow for team training and 
events, and support psychological health. A recent literature review and operations assessment of 
NHV related to the Team Risk has found many individual issues may scale up to affect team 
functioning and performance (Kearney, 2015) (Category III). For example, issues of crowding, 
privacy, and traffic flow all affect individuals’ well-being, which may affect performance on a 
team. Additionally, there are several team-specific issues that call for more research as to how 
NHV affects the team and that have implications for habitat design to support team performance 
and functioning. The physical environment for performing tasks may call for separation or a 
shared space, configurable as the tasks demands differing levels of communication and “co-
presence”. Configurability of the environment may facilitate team task switching, but used 
poorly or designed poorly, may result in more conflict or a fracturing of the team. Research in 
this area is needed. 
 
b. Teams & Sleep 
Another area of cross-discipline integration in need of research is that of sleep and circadian 
factors as they affect teams. The Sleep Risk chapter of this Evidence Book provides a wealth of 
evidence related to the physiological need for sleep, effects on individual performance and 
functioning (e.g., decision-making, reaction time, sensorimotor, attention, mood), and spaceflight 
countermeasures. Team cohesion and interactions may serve as a buffer to counteract negative 
effects of work overload, lack of sleep, and circadian desynchrony, but little research takes place 
looking at these issues at the team-level. Military teams are attuned to the risks of sleep and have 
conducted some research in this area. A study of military teams during an artillery operation 
found that after extended wakefulness of 24 hours, teams decreased communications and 
coordination, and made errors by firing on prohibited targets (Fletcher, Wesenten, Kandelaars, & 
Balkin, 2012) (Category III). Research on high-performing, elite sports teams has found teams 
from cities on the east coast are at a disadvantage and experience a lower winning percentage 
when they play night games on the west coast, which translates to a much later start time than for 
their home games on the east coast (Smith, Efron, Mah, & Malhotra, 2013) (Category III). 
NASA operates on a 24 hour schedule; thus, consideration of sleep and the multi-team system of 
MCC operations is needed. 
 
c. Team Robotics 
Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) is an established human factors research area and future 
LDEMs will require the use of robotics and automation to unburden the crew of workload as 
needed. Robots developed by NASA and JAXA have been tested on ISS. NASA’s Robonaut 2 is 
designed to be highly dexterous, capable of performing simple, repetitive or dangerous tasks on 
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the ISS in place of crew members. JAXA’s Kirobo is equipped with voice recognition, language 
processing, communication and speaking operations, and facial recognition, to help crew 
members perform experiments and other tasks. However, consideration of the psychological 
response to such a team member has seen little research beyond the human factors perspective of 
strategically offloading tasks and workload to robots. Recent research suggests designers 
consider social capabilities of collaborative robots to improve effectiveness as “co-workers” and 
support positive responses to the robot (Sauppé & Mutlu, 2015) (Category IV). For the Team 
Risk, team robotics considers the robot not simply as tool or “pet” for the crew to offload work 
and monitor systems, but as an integrated team member. Relevant research from human factors 
may inform the robot design to evoke positive affect and trust in the automated systems. Team-
level factors may approach this to the extent that the robot supports team performance and 
functioning by facilitating learning and operations in new and complex situations. For some 
tasks, there may need to be persistent human-robot teaming, as is currently being explored for 
use in robot-assisted disaster response efforts for the European Union’s Community Research 
and Development Information Service (EU CORDIS) and in a new research initiative by the U.S. 
Air Force.  
 
4. Team Emergent States 
a. Team Cohesion, Trust, and Conflict 
Defining Cohesion 
As researchers at the U.S. Army Research Institute (ARI) note in their review of cohesion as a 
construct, the definition of cohesion is ambiguous; therefore, the means of measuring cohesion is 
complex. The ARI authors conclude that “cohesion can best be conceptualized as a 
multidimensional construct consisting of numerous factors representing interpersonal and task 
dynamics” (Grice and Katz, 2005) (Category IV). Despite the inexact, less-than-rigorous 
understanding of cohesion as a construct, the ARI researchers do note that anyone who has 
worked with or played on a team knows what a cohesive team looks like, and that teams that are 
more cohesive usually perform better than less-cohesive teams. One review of the cohesion 
definitional and measurement literature suggested that team cohesion should include task and 
social dimensions (e.g., team goals, closeness), behavioral and attitudinal markers (e.g., 
belongingness, group pride, loyalty, morale), and a longitudinal component (Salas, Grossman, 
Hughes, & Coultas, 2015) (Category IV). For this chapter, the general definition presented is 
simply a team working together towards a common goal or to satisfy members’ psychosocial 
needs. It is also important to note that team cohesion is distinct from individual morale. Although 
an individual’s low morale may influence team cohesion (and possibly vice versa), it is possible 
for a team to remain cohesive with low-morale members. 
 
Operationalizing cohesion  
This summary of cohesion literature also provides examples of what a cohesive team may look 
like, as operationalized through various measurement methods (Salas et al., 2015) (Category III). 
Members of cohesive teams sit closer together, spend time with each other outside of work, 
focus more attention on one another, hold eye gazes, show signs of mutual affection, interact 
with greater frequency and in closer proximity for longer durations, and display coordinated 
patterns of behavior. Members of cohesive teams who have established a close relationship are 
more likely to give due credit to their partners. In contrast, those who do not have a close 
relationship within a team are more likely to take credit for successes and blame others for 
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failure. Cohesion may be measured through surveys and interviews, or through unobtrusive 
observations and content analysis of written and oral communications. Newer physiological 
measures also capture cohesion through brainwave data and algorithms, and sociometric badges 
logging the proximity and frequency of interactions among team members.  
 
Outcomes  
Research summarized above provides information related to predictors of team cohesion. The 
relationship of team cohesion and team performance has been the subject of several meta-
analyses, with results suggesting a positive relationship between the two, but many studies have 
neglected to consider duration (Mathieu et al., 2015) (Category I). An analysis of 40 years of 
military research noted positive relationships among cohesion and numerous performance 
outcomes, including individual and group performance, behavioral health, job satisfaction, 
readiness to perform, and absence of discipline problems (Oliver, Harman, Hoover, Hayes, 
& Pandhi, 2000) (Category I). Another meta-analysis found that as work required more 
collaboration, the cohesion-performance relationship became stronger and highly cohesive 
teams became more likely to perform better than less-cohesive teams (Beal, Cohen, Burke, 
& McLendon, 2003) (Category I). Mathieu and colleagues’ (2015) recent investigation of this 
relationship over time found that cohesion and performance were related positively and 
reciprocally, and that this relationship continued over time. Studies in Antarctic populations 
found similar patterns of cohesion and performance as mutually supportive over time 
(Kozlowski, Chang, & Biswas, 2015) (Category III). Additionally, the cohesion predicting 
performance pathway was stronger than the reverse, grew stronger over time, and shared 
leadership was positively related to cohesion. Team cohesion can be viewed as both a predictor 
and an outcome, and has been referred to consistently as an emergent state (Marks, Mathieu, & 
Zaccaro, 2001). This pattern is evident in other team-level factors; that is, the relationships 
between team factors change over time, relating more strongly/weakly to outcomes and being 
influenced by outcomes in turn. For LDEM, the dynamic nature of these relationships over time 
have major implications related to the monitoring and maintenance of team-level variables, 
especially cohesion, and hold clues to the implementation of timely countermeasures. 
 
While relationship conflict is most salient when considering team functioning and performance, 
a meta-analysis of 484 effect sizes found task conflict, process conflict, and relationship conflict 
are all negatively related to group member commitment (De Wit et al., 2012) (Category I). 
Relationship conflict and process conflict was negatively related to cohesion, while task conflict 
was not related to cohesion, suggesting that task conflicts may occur without breaking the team 
apart and the interpersonal relationships are more important to the emergent and affective states. 
For performance outcomes, task conflict was positively related when controlling for the other 
types of conflict, and process and relationship conflict was negatively related to group 
performance. Thus, interpersonal conflict and conflict about roles and responsibilities result in 
more negative outcomes, a likely reason that NASA already finds value in providing conflict 
management training to the ASCANs. Conversely, disagreements with regard to the task may 
cause teams to reevaluate and think more critically about the content and outcomes of the task, 
and is a more accepted form of conflict within well-functioning teams. Other team cognition 
research suggests, however, that shared task models may help a spaceflight team coordinate 
more effectively (Fiore et al., 2015) (Category III). A moderate level of task conflict will prevent 
negative team processes such as groupthink, while allowing for shared mental models that 
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facilitate team effectiveness. Another meta-analysis (Stahl et al., 2010) (Category I) found that 
cultural diversity may also increase task conflict and decrease social integration and cohesion, 
which highlights the importance of pre-mission training to overcome these differences that may 
negatively influence teamwork processes. In general, teamwork processes and emergent states of 
team potency and team cohesion are positively correlated (LePine et al., 2008) (Category I).  
 
Conflict (i.e., task, process, and relationship conflict) was also found to be negatively related to 
trust (De Wit et al., 2012) (Category I). Trust is often conceptualized as willingness to make 
oneself vulnerable to others, and trusting others has been identified an aspect of the personality 
trait agreeableness (Stanton, 2011), which has implications for selection. Within military teams, 
trust has been studied extensively for intact teams, action teams, distributed teams, and teams 
from multiple military branches and countries. A literature review and qualitative assessment of 
trust in distributed Army teams suggested that trust includes aspects of the individual or team’s 
trustworthiness, based on competence, character, and dependability; trustor characteristics that 
may influence their judgment of others as trustworthy; moderators, such as situational 
conditions; and trust-related behaviors (Cianciolo, Evans, DeCostanza, & Pierce, 2011) 
(Category III). For the context of military and related LDEM teams, the researchers approach the 
trust-related behavior as risk management. For example, an individual may be deemed 
trustworthy due to KSAs and past behaviors, and if the situation is one in which there is proven 
success, the team member is likely to be assigned as the likelihood of failure is deemed low. 
Other factors, such as cultural or gender diversity, may lead to difficulties in building that trust 
due to perceived differences of mental models and other values or KSA characteristics, but 
adopting other’s conventions and multi-cultural training together and overcoming those initial 
hurdles to building trust. A United States Air Force study found that teams together for a longer 
duration had greater trust (Lyons, Funke, Nelson, & Knott, 2011) (Category I). Team trust 
positively affects team functioning and effectiveness in military teams (Lee, Bond, Russell, Tost, 
Gonzalez, & Scarbrough, 2010), and organizational teams reported a positive relationship 
between trust and team satisfaction and task performance (Costa, 2003). When trust is violated, 
conflict management techniques and even apology is effective to rebuild that trust (Stanton, 
2011). Mutual trust among team members, and across the multi-team system, ensures that the 
team can work autonomously and efficiently, without resources wasted on too much monitoring, 
carrying extra workload due to perceived incompetence, or needlessly questioning leadership or 
expertise.  
 
Research that was conducted in the Antarctic also investigated conflict, cohesion, and 
performance. In one Antarctic expedition, scientists reported that team members’ perceptions of 
status contributed to conflicts and reduced perceptions of cohesion (Dutta Roy & Deb, 1999) 
(Category III). Wood, Schmidt, Lugg, Ayton, Phillips, & Shepanek, (2005) (Category III) also 
collected data on human performance in Antarctica over a 10-year period, modeling individual 
and group effects on adaptation to life in this extreme environment using multilevel analyses. 
Positive team climate and cohesion helped to reduce interpersonal tensions, which, in turn, 
contributed to work satisfaction. In addition to several meta-analyses showing the link between 
cohesion and performance, a recent study of Antarctic ICE teams found that cohesion and 
performance are mutually supportive, and positive affect was negatively related to conflict and 
negative affect (Kozlowski, Chang, Perry, Pearce, Dixon, & Santoro, 2015) (Category I,III). This 
research team found similar results in HERA (cohesion increased over time and led to less 
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conflict), HI-SEAS (cohesion increased over time and was positively related to performance, 
increases in positive affect and cohesion were negatively related to next day negative affect), and 
in lab studies (positive affect was a buffer for negative affect and conflict). Allowing time for a 
team to reach a stable, acceptable level of cohesion and trust before mission is important for 
stability of the team during mission. Finding ways to bridge gaps due to diversity of cultures or 
expertise may be accomplished through mission simulations in analogs such as NEEMO and 
HERA (Noe et al., 2011) (Category IV). Identifying other commonalities to create a new “space” 
culture has been a suggested tactic at the multi-national European Space Agency (Sandal & 
Manzey, 2009) (Category IV) and been a successful approach on the ISS (David, Rubino, 
Keeton, Miller, & Patterson, 2011) (Category III).  
 
b. Psychosocial adaptation, and team adaptation and resilience  
Spaceflight is an inherently stressful experience, and many aspects of ICE analogs and other 
environments such as military operations, have much to say regarding successful adaptation and 
performance. Ground-based research involving similar conditions (e.g., submarines, offshore oil 
rigs, polar stations) has found that such conditions are generally detrimental to psychological 
health and social well-being over prolonged periods (Braun and Sells, 1962; Britt and Bliese, 
2003; Krueger, 2001; NASA, 1987). Epidemiologists have noted higher mortality rates among 
socially isolated patients (House, 2001) (Category III), and physicians have described more 
issues with depression and somatic illnesses in conjunction with longer periods of relative social 
isolation among Antarctic expeditioners (Lugg, 1977; Lugg, 2005) (Category III). Some 
individuals may naturally be more suited to these environments. For example, individuals who 
were low in extroversion and assertiveness adapt better to life in Antarctica (Rosnet, Le Scanff, 
Sagal, 2000) (Category III), and a review of the psychosocial literature for LDEM found that 
personality predicts stress and health outcomes (Schmidt, 2015). As noted previously, however, 
ground-based evidence indicates that teams with more moderately extroverted members, not 
dominant, generally perform better (Bell et al., 2015) (Category III). Research must still 
determine how to balance individual extroversion at levels that are encouraging to both 
psychosocial adaptation and team performance. The process of psychological and social 
adjustment to environmental conditions and demands is known as psychosocial adaptation, while 
team adaptation and resilience emphasizes the adaptation in responses and outcomes to a trigger 
event. These different, but related, constructs both influence team performance and functioning. 
 
The BMed Risk area provides substantial information for individuals’ adaptation to ICE 
conditions, but the team may act as a buffering and supporting mechanism for psychosocial 
adaptation and resilience. For example, research has demonstrated that high social support and 
strong communication among team members may decrease the impact of individual strain, 
buffering negative effects on team effectiveness and performance (Guzzo & Dickson, 1996; 
Theorell and Karasek, 1996). Recent NASA-sponsored reviews of the literature created a data-
supported model by considering over 200 articles (with 94 quantitative articles) of psychosocial 
factors in spaceflight and analogous populations (Schmidt, 2015) (Category I, III) and clarified 
the nomological network of the relationships between team adaptation and resilience across 15 
years of research and a forthcoming operations assessment with NASA SMEs (Maynard et al., 
2015) (Category III). It is important to note that adaptation may be an individual and team trait 
(i.e., adaptability), the adaptation of team processes (e.g., changing actions), and an adaptive 
outcome such as creating a new plan or tool or social relationship (Mathieu & Kennedy, 2015) 
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(Category IV). The relationships among psychosocial adaptation, health, learning, productivity, 
and performance are somewhat reciprocal at both the individual and the team levels (e.g., good 
health improves psychosocial adaptation and learning, satisfaction with learning and team 
performance improves psychosocial adaptation, etc.) (Burke, Stagl, Salas, Pierce, & Kendall, 
2006; Buunk, Doosje, Jans, & Hopstaken, 1993; House, Landis Umberson, Salovey, & Rothman, 
2003; Israel, House, Schurman, & Heaney, 1989; Kramer, 1993; Vogt, Rizvi, Shipherd, & 
Resick, 2008) (Category II, III).  Additionally, team resilience has a reciprocal relationship with 
adaptation of team processes such that processes influence the emergent state of resilience (and 
other emergent states of cohesion and trust), which then influence team processes (Maynard & 
Kennedy, 2015) (Category IV). For example, a team member might become the leader during a 
particular task, leading the team to feel enhanced efficacy and trust due to the leader’s expertise 
in the task. These emergent states then streamline the team processes as the team members 
recognize each member is in an appropriate role and that they may decrease the degree of needed 
backup and devote more attention to the task.  
 
These recent reviews highlight the importance of selecting and composing a team of individuals 
that are adaptable and resilient, but that adaptation and resilience may also be developed and 
maintained through training and on-mission countermeasures. For example, the individual input 
layer of the psychosocial model revealed a positive relationship between self-care and team 
performance (Schmidt, 2015) (Category I,III). Recall that self-care, which states that an 
individual manages personal health, stress, training, schedule, and fatigue to maintain readiness, 
was also identified as a very important factor in the LDEM job analysis (Barrett et al., 2015) 
(Category III). Thus, an individual may take actions to remain resilient, in addition to possessing 
inherent characteristics of resilience. Characteristics of the situation may support adaptation such 
as increased autonomy and team autonomy. Autonomous teams, especially those in ICE 
environments, have a greater understanding of the situation they are experiencing than the 
command center, and are able to adapt on demand to the changing needs of a situation. In a lab 
study of Naval officers introduced to incongruent information, teams were able to autonomously 
adapt to the situation and improve mission effectiveness (Diedrich, Freeman, Entin, & 
MacMillan, 2005) (Category II). An adaptable leader may further support this process. Meta-
analyses found that psychological empowerment, which can be induced by a transformational 
leader, is positively related to job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and task and 
contextual and team performance, and negatively related to employee strain and turnover 
intentions (Seibert et al., 2011; Stewart, 2006) (Category I). Team empowerment was also 
positively related to team performance.  
 
Adaptation to ICE environments usually emphasizes the adaptation to the situation, event, or 
context, but there is also a period of adaptation to the team and other team members. Training 
competencies of group living and teamwork, communication, leadership/follower, etc., 
developing shared cognition, and undergoing adaptability training will provide teams with the 
skills they need to live and work as a team during long duration. It is also important that teams 
spend considerable time together, a minimum of six weeks, to allow adaptation to occur pre-
mission (Schmidt, 2015) (Category IV). Six weeks allows an ICE team to evolve through team 
development stages of “forming” (i.e., getting to know teammates), “storming” (e.g., recognizing 
differences, experiencing frictions), “norming” (e.g., establishing shared group norms), to 
eventually enter into the “performing” stage (e.g., demonstrating competence, motivation, 
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autonomy, effective problem-solving, and team functioning). More research considering 
psychosocial adaptation, and the adaptation processes and resilience of a team over time during 
the mission are needed to understand how factors support and mitigate each other to maintain 
optimal psychosocial functioning. For example, a study of longer peacekeeping mission 
deployments for 3,339 military personnel were associated with increased reports of depression 
and post-traumatic stress syndrome (Adler & Dolan, 2006) (Category III). Investigation of team 
countermeasures and countermeasure timing during LDEM is needed.  
 
Summary points related to ground-based evidence and team emergent states: 
 Team cohesion is a complex construct that includes social dimensions, behavioral and 
attitudinal markers, and a time component. Cohesion has a positive, reciprocal 
relationship with team performance.  
 Psychosocial adaptation, adaptation, and resilience may occur at both the individual and 
team level. Successful adaptation and resilience positively affects performance and 
psychological well-being. 
o Selection, team composition, and training need further development to support 
positive team emergent states in ICE conditions.  
 
5. Measures and Monitoring Technologies 
Current spaceflight analog research has increasingly turned to the utilization of unobtrusive 
methods of measurement, in addition to typical self-report measures. Unobtrusive measures offer 
several advantages: avoidance of crew time burdens needed for surveys or other active 
measurement techniques, lessening “survey fatigue” related to constant reporting that may 
interfere with accurate ratings, and acknowledgement of and response to the general dislike of 
surveys. Additionally, unobtrusive measures allow for more frequent, consistent measures to 
support real-time monitoring and response. A team of NASA-sponsored researchers developed a 
set of tools to conduct lexical analysis of both written text (i.e., journals) and transcripts of verbal 
communications (Wu, Miller, Ott, Schmer-Galunder, & Rye, 2015) (Category III). Simple words 
counts, latent semantic analysis (i.e., juxtaposition of a word with positive/negative words), use 
of phrases denoting politeness, verb tenses, turn-taking, etc., all provide information regarding 
the underlying moods and attitudes of the individual. Findings across mission simulation analogs 
and bed-rest studies suggest this is a valid approach for measuring mood and emotions, salience 
of topics, and sentiment towards past/present/future, self- vs. other-focused, and tracking these 
variables over time. Other real-time lexical indicator technology was developed to track 
cognitive and emotional states in verbal utterances, especially how detected stress was related to 
decrements in performance and well-being (Salas & Driskell, 2015) (Category II). Findings from 
two mission simulation analogs found that these lexical measures were consistent with self-
report surveys of emotions and detected emotion variation related to off-nominal days (e.g., high 
workload). Stress was detected in speech by differences in attention, cognitive load, anxiety, 
negative emotion, and impairment of the team perspective and the social climate.  
 
Another technology tested in multiple mission simulation analogs and Antarctic stations is the 
sociometric badges detecting proximity and within-team interactions (Kozlowski, Chang, Perry, 
Pearce, Dixon, & Santoro, 2015) (Category III). High reliability and accuracy were found for 
interaction and affective data, suggesting this is a viable technology for classifying the team 
cohesion and collaboration. Video feeds have been used with an optical computer recognition 
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(OCR) program to detect emotion, fatigue, and stress displays through facial movements during 
Mars 500 and in HERA (Dinges, 2015). Further work is needed to determine if these are valid 
measures of cohesion and other team dynamic variables, but data show promising trends and 
validity for detecting emotions among team members. Astronauts already experience some level 
of physiological monitoring, for example, heart rate. Unobtrusive measures lessen the demand 
for astronauts’ time needed in-flight to fill out surveys or perform other obtrusive reporting 
mechanism. A multi-modal approach integrating several technologies provide a richness of data 
for monitoring individual’s health and well-being as well as that of team performance and 
functioning. On a LDEM, preventing survey fatigue is one plus, but a more important outcome 
of unobtrusive measures stems from the increased autonomy and isolation of the team. Teams far 
from Earth under a communication delay may be able to detect growing negative emotions, 
decreasing team cohesion, or increasing fatigue, and implement a countermeasure to mitigate the 
impending performance or well-being decrement, all before communications sent from the 
vehicle even reach MCC. Extending this technology to predicting individual and team 
performance and indicating appropriate timing of countermeasures is a long-term goal for future 
LDEM. While some researchers (e.g., Kanas at al., 2009) have stated a constant stream of 
objective data regarding the psychosocial climate of the crew is needed, it is important to have a 
balanced approach where meaningful information is provided to the crew as well as the support 
team on Earth.    
 
V. COMPUTER-BASED MODELING AND SIMULATION 
Researchers in the social sciences and Industrial/Organizational psychology have renewed 
interest in examining teamwork processes and outcomes through modeling and simulation. 
Recent research on teams reflects the maturity of complex computing and statistical approaches, 
particularly through use of agent-based modeling and simulation (ABMS), but there is a dearth 
of spaceflight and analog research using this advanced methodology. ABMS has been 
underutilized in organizational research (Hughes, Clegg, Robinson, & Crowder, 2012) (Category 
IV). Related to the LDEM context, ABMS has been identified as useful for research in high-
consequence environments, when practicality or ethics limits real-world research, when 
researchers are seeking a holistic understanding of systems, and to examine feedback loops and 
the impact of time. Spaceflight and analog research have all of these limitations to some degree, 
and thus, ABMS may be particularly appropriate for studying teams in complex ICE conditions 
over a long duration. Future research leveraging the potential of ABMS is needed.  
 
VI. RISK IN CONTEXT OF EXPLORATION MISSION OPERATIONAL SCENARIOS 
A. Constraints for exploration missions  
Exploration missions are divided into different lengths of duration. Short duration, 
conceptualized as an asteroid mission, will likely take place over a matter of a few weeks. Long 
duration, conceptualized as a planetary or Mars mission, will last up to 30 months. The Team 
Risk is more focused on preparing for long duration missions, since the risks of long duration 
teams living and working together is less studied and less understood in the literature. Anecdotal 
reports from operational assessments and the astronaut journals indicate that many astronauts 
believe they can “get along with anyone” for a short period of time, often recalling the frenetic, 
quick trips of Shuttle missions. A few ISS astronauts have also self-identified as less suited to 
long duration after they experienced long duration spaceflight (Stuster, 2010) (Category III). 
51 
 
Throughout this evidence report, attention has be focused on long duration, which continues to 
be the focus of the Team Risk for exploration mission research. 
 
Constraints for future long duration, planetary exploration missions are outlined in the Mars 
Design Reference Architecture (DRM) 5.0 (Drake, 2009), with updated considerations as part of 
the Evolvable Mar Campaign (Crusan, 2014). While some constraints remain static across 
exploration mission types, other constraints will vary by mission (see Table 6). 
 
Table 6. Summary of characteristics across exploration mission types.  
Characteristics Similar Across Mission Types Characteristics Varied Across Mission Types 
 Multi-cultural crew 
 Mixed gender 
 Mixed technical expertise 
 Designated mission commander 
 Small net habitable volume and limited 
privacy 
 Communication delay with Earth 
 No crew rotation 
 Increased autonomy from MCC as 
compared to current operations 
 Lengthy pre-training 
 Size of crew (i.e., 4-6)  
 Size of habitat (i.e., 9m3 transit vehicle vs. 
transit vehicle and 80m3 surface habitat) 
 Length of communication delay (i.e., a 
few seconds vs. 22 minutes) 
 Mission duration (i.e., 30 days vs. 30 
months)  
 Degree of autonomy (i.e., minimal but to 
a greater degree than ISS vs. large degree) 
 
Many of these risks have been addressed above as the Team Risk research portfolio is oriented to 
future missions, but a summary of threats is as follows. 
 
B. Exploration mission hazards of interest to the Team Risk  
1. Primary and secondary hazards  
The primary hazard identified for the Team Risk is isolation, while the secondary hazards are the 
closed environment and extreme distance from Earth. As the crew travels further from Earth, the 
physical isolation will be compounded by the one-way communication delay of up to 22 minutes 
between Earth and Mars. Many factors investigated by the BMed Risk are related to isolation 
from family and friends, as well as to nature and views of Earth, and the harmful psychological 
and physiological outcomes of this stressful situation. A closed environment does not allow for 
crew rotation. For teams, this isolation requires greater attention to initial selection and team 
composition due to a non-rotating crew that must possess technical skills and adaptability to 
successfully overcome off-nominal events without real-time coordination with ground or the 
possibility of evacuation. In-flight training and other activities to maintain within team cohesion 
and a sense of connectedness with others on Earth may reduce stressors on the team and keep the 
team functioning as a unit within the MTS. Meaningful team taskwork and group leisure 
activities such as group meals, movie nights and milestone celebrations, will also stimulate the 
team and foster cohesion. Careful planning and design of the habitat and the supplies are 
necessary as there will be no resupply possible. Digitizing engaging activities with regular 
updates sent to the team and virtual environments designed for use by multiple team members 
simultaneously will offer some relief. Creating countermeasures such as the DebriefNow, which 
is “owned” by the in-flight team without needed intervention from ground to support team 
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communication, will allow the team to maintain function as they become more autonomous and 
isolated. 
 
2. Other contributing factors  
Other LDEM factors may pose a hazard to the team, but some may also be used as leverage 
points for countermeasures to maintain team performance and functioning. Behavioral 
competency training, both pre-training and in-flight, will ensure teamwork skills meet the needs 
of the mission. Workload and scheduling should be designed as to not create undo psychological 
or physical stress on the crew, and allow time for adequate sleep periods. Allowance of some 
self-direction of schedules, for example, setting overarching weekly goals at MCC while the 
team determines how to achieve those goals is one avenue to address increased team autonomy. 
Careful selection and team composition of a diverse crew that avoids faultlines and builds a 
multi-dimensional network of connections, cohesion, and shared team cognition, requires 
additional support through training and other team countermeasures. Engaging activities, social 
events, and communications with home, albeit with communication delays, may help 
psychological health and lessen the social monotony. Communication delays preventing the 
current practice of real-time PPCs and Private Medical Conferences (PMCs) call for new 
avenues of within-team support, telemedicine and psychologically supportive countermeasures to 
support mental health and physical health. Finally, habitat design calls for adequate volume and 
layout supporting team activities (e.g., training, social time, community meals) and cohesion. 
There are likely unknown hazards to the team, requiring the team to be psychologically 
adaptable and resilient to off-nominal events and stress, to develop and maintain adaptability 
skills through training and countermeasures, and to have tools (e.g., 3D printers, configurable 
habitat) that will support adaptation. Pre-mission planning and preparation of the team, the multi-
team system, and the international partnerships between the space agencies and their respective 
countries must come to an agreement long before launch date.  
“When we go on the international expedition to Mars, we will have to work a lot harder 
at coming to a common agreement of what the norms and standards are as currently on 
the ISS there is still sort of dividing line and we play by whoever’s rules it is.” – NASA 
Flight Director (Burke & Feitosa, 2015) (Category IV).  
 
VII. GAPS 
At the time of publication, BHP has identified eight research knowledge gaps related to the risk 
of performance and behavioral health decrements due to inadequate cooperation, coordination, 
communication, and psychosocial adaptation within a team (Team). A summary can be found in 
the HRP’s Roadmap to Risk Reduction (“Risk”, 2015) and are as follows:  
Team1:   We need to understand the key threats, indicators, and life cycle of the team for 
autonomous, long duration and/or distance exploration missions. 
Team2:   We need to identify a set of validated measures, based on the key indicators of 
team function, to effectively monitor and measure team health and performance 
fluctuations during autonomous, long duration and/or distance exploration 
missions. 
Team3:   We need to identify a set of countermeasures to support team function for all 
phases of autonomous, long duration and/or distance exploration missions. 
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Team4:   We need to identify psychological measures that can be used to select 
individuals most likely to maintain team function for autonomous, long duration 
and/or distance exploration missions. 
Team5:   We need to identify validated ground-based training methods that can be both 
preparatory and continuing to maintain team function in autonomous, long 
duration, and/or distance exploration missions. 
Team6:   We need to identify methods to support and enable multiple distributed teams to 
manage shifting levels of autonomy during long duration and/or distance 
exploration missions. 
Team8:  We need to identify psychological and psychosocial factors, measures, and 
combinations thereof that can be used to compose highly effective crews for 
autonomous, long duration and/or distance exploration missions. 
Team9:   We need to identify spaceflight acceptable thresholds (or ranges) of team 
function, based on key indicators, for autonomous, long duration and/or distance 
exploration missions. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
BHP research provides the knowledge, tools, and technologies that support crew health to 
prevent or mitigate the Team Risk. These efforts are operationally driven, and mapped onto 
milestones related to the PRR that stems from future LDEMs timelines. Veteran astronauts and 
ground control personnel have expressed the need for training requirements and countermeasures 
to improve crew cohesion and reduce the likelihood of performance errors that are caused by 
inconsistent and suboptimal team dynamics. Some missions may have been jeopardized and, 
possibly, terminated as a result of interpersonal frictions in the past; therefore, the first priority of 
the BHP Team Risk involves reducing the risk of team conflict, maintaining cohesion, and 
developing appropriate countermeasures.  
 
Much work has examined and continues to examine workplace teams, and there are a multitude 
of meta-analyses to use as a foundation to team research. The growing body of evidence from 
ground-based analogs adds unique value to the research on more traditional workplace teams. 
Differences between traditional workplace teams and teams in ICE analogs or analogous 
populations such as the military, highlight the future research and countermeasure needs related 
to LDEMs. Spaceflight evidence related to teams is somewhat limited insofar as team 
performance and functioning measures have not been implemented in a systematic way. 
However, there exist preliminary findings, in addition to more concrete conclusions, that are 
beginning to fill gaps for future LDEM. For example, careful selection of individuals and 
composition of a team may mitigate faultlines and other threats that result in team conflict. 
Communication skills training, supported by regular team debrief and feedback events, enables 
the team to maintain shared cognition and overcome conflict. Evidence also supports the 
important role of environmental context in influencing team performance. Thus, investigating 
best practices in selection, composition, and skills training in the particular context of LDEMs 
leverages existing research to shorten time to identifying best practices in LDEMs.  
 
In a similar way, existing or ground-based technologies can be leveraged for LDEM teams. The 
second priority of the BHP Team Risk is to develop unobtrusive monitoring technologies for 
detection of deteriorating team performance and team functioning, a condition that will 
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ultimately decrease crew performance and well-being. For example, the sociometric badges offer 
real-time monitoring of crew cohesion and interaction patterns with very little maintenance time 
needed by crew members. Development of these badges in analog research also allows later 
implementation for other co-located workplace teams, beyond the spaceflight context. These 
unobtrusive monitoring tools are enable LDEM crews to self-monitor in real-time, which is 
important as communication delays between crew and ground increase the crew’s autonomy and 
decrease multi-team coordination. Understanding the implications of communication delays and 
supporting team performance during these conditions is the third priority of the BHP Team Risk. 
Preliminary work has been completed, but more research is needed in this area to understand the 
risk and validate training and other countermeasures.  
 
In summary, BHP research into the Team Risk will support future LDEM teams and will further 
the overall scientific understanding of teams, especially of teams in extreme environments. The 
BHP Element has identified gaps in knowledge and mitigation strategies that are related to these 
issues. To close these gaps, the BHP Team Risk needs to pursue more rigorous, longitudinal 
research designs and a multi-method research program. High-fidelity space analogs or current 
spaceflight studies are needed to test the utility of the tools and countermeasures that will be 
designed to promote optimal performance and support the psychosocial health of astronauts who 
are on long-duration missions. Optimal performance and team functioning mitigates the 
frequency and negative effects of performance errors. Ensuring team resilience and cohesion 
buffers the effects from ICE-related psychological and physiological stressors and supports long-
duration exploration mission success.  
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ABMS: Agent-Based Modeling and Simulation 
ANSMET: Antarctic Search for Meteorites 
ARI: Army Research Institute 
ASCAN: Astronaut Candidate 
BHP: Behavioral Health and Performance 
BMED: Behavioral Medicine 
CAPCOM: Capsule Communicator 
CAVES: Cooperative Adventure for Valuing and Exercising human behavior and performance 
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CRM: Crew Resource Management 
CSA: Canadian Space Agency 
D-RATS: Desert Research and Technology Studies  
DRM: Design Reference Architecture 
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EU CORDIS: European Union’s Community Research and Development Information Service 
EVA: Extra Vehicular Activity 
HCI: Human-Computer Interaction 
HERA: Human Exploration Research Analog 
HI-SEAS: Hawai’i Space Exploration Analog and Simulation 
HRP: Human Research Program 
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IP: Internet Protocol 
IRP: Integrated Research Plan 
ISS: International Space Station 
JAXA: Japanese Aerospace and Exploration Agency 
JSC: Johnson Space Center 
KSA: knowledge, skills, abilities 
LDEM: Long Duration Exploration Mission 
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MCC: Mission Control Center 
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NEEMO: NASA Extreme Environment Mission Operations 
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NOLS: National Outdoor Leadership School 
NTSB: National Transportation Safety Board 
PMC: Private Medical Conferences 
PPC: Private Psychological Conferences 
PRD: Program Requirements Document  
PRR: Pathway to Risk Reduction 
RATS: Research and Technology Studies  
RSA: Russian Space Agency 
SFINCSS: Simulated Flight of International Crew on Space Station 
SFRM: Spaceflight Resource Management 
SHFH: Space Human Factors and Habitability 
SME: Subject Matter Experts 
STEM: Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics   
TDT: Team Dimensional Training 
TtO: Transitions to Operations 
USAF: United States Air Force 
 
 
 
 
  
